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Introduction 
During the last 15 years Putin’s policies have produced a number 
of controversial effects both at the international and domestic 
levels, some diplomatic results (Syria, Iran), and unresolved 
regional conflicts (such as in Chechnya, Georgia and, currently, 
Ukraine). In strictly domestic terms, the early Putin era seemed to 
bring a sense of stability that most Russians had long waited for, 
after Yeltsin’s chaotic years, often called the “crazy 90’s”. More 
recently, mainly owing to high oil prices which remained over 
hundred dollars for the most part of 2008-2014, the Russian 
economy experienced a stable and rapid growth. However, as soon 
as the oil price dropped and sanctions were imposed on the 
country due to the Ukrainian crisis, its economy and currency 
inevitably plummeted. The rationale behind it is also the 
Kremlin’s growing power centralization in both the economic and 
political spheres, which goes hand in hand with the lack of 
economic reforms and over reliance on energy revenues. 
When it comes, in particular, to Moscow’s attitude towards the 
European Union, things have dramatically changed since Putin 
was first elected President in 2000. At the beginning of his first 
mandate, Putin opted for a Moscow-centered path, thus trying to 
gain popular support at home by overcoming the highly criticized 
Yeltsin’s policies that were increasingly read as both ineffective 
and unjust. In foreign policy he accordingly launched the idea of a 
Greater Europe. Actually, the project was anything but new. It had 
already been suggested by both Gorbachev and Yeltsin, although 
it took a clear-cut shape only under Putin’s presidency. The 
Greater Europe project was rooted in the existence of a ‘would-be’ 
common and integrated space and included two pillars: the EU 
area, with Germany at its core, and the Eurasian Union under 
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undisputable Russia’s influence. To this aim and with the view to 
highlighting the goodwill of the Russian government to enhance 
cooperation with the European Union as a pro-active and equal 
partner, some important steps were taken including the Bologna 
process (implemented by Russia in 2007), visa liberalization for 
some categories of Russian citizens, Partnership for 
Modernization (promoting EU-Russia technological scientific 
exchange) and, to some extent, energy security cooperation. 
However, this strategy proved to be short-lived. Clearly Russia 
overestimated its ability to convince its European partners to share 
the same path – on equal footing – to build a common economic 
and security architecture. Sooner than expected, political 
divergences and vital interests emerged. As a result, the Greater 
Europe project was progressively frozen, if not plainly abandoned. 
As of 2012, Russia started to actively promote its “turn towards 
Asia”, or simply put towards China, which is, at the same time, 
both a key partner and a major challenge for Moscow. So it comes 
as no surprise that the Eurasian project started to rank high in 
Russia’s foreign policy. The Ukrainian crisis made this trend 
crystal clear, and inevitably led to Russia’s isolation from the 
West, which, in turn, ignited a strong anti-Western stance, shared 
by the vast majority of the population, also thanks to the effective 
state propaganda.  
To make things worse, the Kiev protests that broke out in 
autumn 2013 further aggravated Russia-EU misunderstandings, 
with the risk of completely compromising 25 years of efforts by 
both sides. Indeed, this showed how weak such efforts had always 
been as the EU-Russia dialogue had never really taken off and 
never achieved high-level and concrete results.  
Against this background, it goes without saying that Moscow 
has always perceived the EU-NATO expansion with hostility. By 
the same token, the EU has regarded with suspicion any form of 
economic and political integration between Russia and post-Soviet 
countries, reading such initiatives as Moscow’s clear attempt to re-
start an imperialist project. Ukraine has thus become the main 
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‘battleground’ where years and years of misunderstandings, 
frustration and “missed opportunities” converged.  
However, the joint EU-Russia joint attempts to solve the 
Ukrainian crises, which were undertaken during the “Normandy 
Four” meetings (Germany, France, Russia, Ukraine), resulted in 
signing the weak – but still important – Minsk agreements. This 
helps to prove that there is still room for cooperation between the 
two sides. These agreements may hopefully set the stage for a 
more comprehensive deal aiming to close the gap between the 
EU’s and Russia’s competing visions.  
Bearing all this in mind, this Report investigates the main 
causes of the revived ‘Cold War’ by providing the points of view 
of the main actors involved (Russia, the U.S., the EU as a whole 
and the “New Europe” in particular) and, at the same time, by 
sketching out viable options to restart the EU-Russia dialogue. 
In their opening chapter, Carmen Claudín and Nicolás de Pedro 
analyse the relationship between the European Union and Russian 
federation in the post-Soviet period. In particular, they place the 
spotlight on the EU ‘soft power’. This concept has acquired a 
negative connotation in Russia’s view, since ‘colour revolutions’ 
are often interpreted as a result of the EU’s expansionism under 
the ‘soft power’ policy umbrella. In particular, the ultimate goal of 
the ‘colour revolution’ – a democratic Ukraine – would be a denial 
of ‘Putinism’. Accordingly, this would demonstrate that there is 
no such thing as an Eastern Slavic specialness that legitimizes a 
model of democracy specific to some Russian tradition.  
However, as Aldo Ferrari put it in chapter 2, competition over 
the post-Soviet space remains the major obstacles to reach mutual 
understanding. The different assessments of ‘colour revolutions’, 
the clash over missile installations in Eastern Europe, the Russian-
Georgian conflict in 2008, the opposing political projects 
regarding post-Soviet states gradually strengthened a sharp 
contrast that exploded at the end of 2013 in Ukraine. According to 
Ferrari the weight of history and the determination of Russia to 
defend its interests have to be seriously taken in account by the 
EU when drafting scenarios for the post-Soviet space. 
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The Ukrainian crisis is therefore the latest episode of a 
progressive deterioration in relations as Luca Ratti highlights in 
chapter 3. Both NATO and the European security architecture are 
still facing unresolved issues which are a legacy of the Cold War. 
Their origins has to be found in the volatile nature of the East-
West settlement which brought the Cold War to an end, with the 
agreements of 1989-1990 failing to clarify the former Soviet 
space’s collocation in the new European security architecture.  
However, one should not make the mistake of considering the 
EU’s policy towards Russia as a monolith, one consistently 
backed by all the member states together, suggests Stefan 
Bielański in chapter 4. The Baltic States with a large Russian-
speaking population and Poland have traditionally had strong anti-
Russian sentiments, fearing the revival of Russia’s imperialistic 
ambitions, which led them to join NATO. On the other hand, 
Hungarian and Czech Republic leaders seem much less worried 
and do not intend to close the door on a foreign policy stance built 
upon closer (at least bilateral) relations with Russia.  
By any account, today’s confrontation between Brussels and 
Moscow is a lose-lose game, according to Ivan Timofeev in 
chapter 5 who underlines the need to relaunch the Russia-EU 
dialogue, and establish a mechanism of regular multilateral 
consultations (contact groups) on the crises in Europe. A key 
condition for this is sparing no effort in achieving a cease-fire in 
Ukraine, by jointly promoting negotiations among the conflicting 
parties and aiming at a long-term solution to the conflict by re-
shaping the country’s territorial structure.  
The benefits of talking with adversaries is also underlined by 
Sean Kay in chapter 6. Even though the United States has often 
sought to isolate governments not adhering to international norms, 
there have been exceptions, like during the 1962 Cuban missile 
crisis, that brought significant results. He argues that Russia’s 
illegal annexation of Crimea has added greater cohesion to the 
West while accelerating a rebalancing of responsibility sharing 
between the United States and Europe. According to Kay a careful 
mix of political and economic punishment, diplomatic 
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engagement, and symbolic reassurance on NATO membership 
may provide a framework for limiting the damage and 
reestablishing Russia-West relations. 
All in all, no one seems to gain from this confrontation. This 
holds true especially for the EU, Russia and post-Soviet countries. 
A viable way-out can be found only by restarting dialogue among 
these actors and acknowledging, instead of ignoring, their 
respective interests. 
 
 
 
Paolo Magri  
ISPI Executive Vice President and Director 
1. The EU and Russia after Crimea: 
Is Ukraine the Knot? 
Carmen Claudín, Nicolás de Pedro 
The annexation of Crimea, the Russian military intervention in 
Eastern Ukraine and the subsequent Western sanctions and 
Russian countersanctions have shaken the ground of the already 
crumbling European status quo. And arguably it is for long to 
come. The anniversary of Helsinki +40, next July 2015, will 
hardly be an occasion for rejoicing. Not only have the dividing 
lines between the East and the West not been erased yet, as was 
envisioned in 1975, new ones have appeared and put the whole 
process under the shadow of the “what’s next?” question. 
The centrality of the Ukrainian question for Russia lies in the 
fact that it is not simply a foreign affairs issue – like Iran or China 
is. Ukraine is at the heart of Russia’s national interests and 
essentialist narrative. On the contrary, for the EU, Ukraine was an 
issue of mere foreign policy – with no perspective at all of an 
institutional integration - but now it has become a matter of self-
assertion and inner coherence of its own values. As for Ukraine, 
the vast majority of its citizens – be them Ukrainian or Russian 
speakers – will not give up their regained independence. So any 
possible arrangement with Russia will be viable only if grounded 
on respect for this premise. 
The EU and Russia have had a problematic relationship since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia has always been at the 
core of the EU’s policy towards its European neighbourhood while 
Moscow has never found a framework to connect with the EU in 
which it would feel truly comfortable. The issue of its relation to 
Europe (and, at the other end, to Asia) has always been complex 
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for Russia and has historically inhabited the heart of its identity 
quest and its debates about the specificity of a Russian way. By 
contrast, no complexity prevails in the relationship with the U.S. 
Here each actor has a clear understanding of each other’s position 
and role in what is regarded as a world competition. 
The EU’s attitudes towards its huge neighbour have evolved 
into what some have called “Russia fatigue”. Whatever official 
statements have said, the EU and its member states separately 
have always seen Russia, although to different degrees, primarily 
as a problem. During Yeltsin’s tenure, the constant alarm focused 
on Russia’s domestic instability. With Putin’s consolidation of 
internal power and economic growth, the concern shifted to his 
increasingly assertive foreign policy. It is therefore the urgency in 
addressing the problem that has largely dictated the EU’s 
behaviour towards Russia and has engraved on it a unique stamp 
in which preventive concern appears inseparable from intents of 
constructive proposals.  
For Russia, the importance of the economic dimension of its 
relations with the EU has never managed to displace the 
Russia/United States axis from its central place in Moscow’s 
foreign policy. In the Russian worldview, a great power is 
measured largely by the stature of its partners/competitors. With 
this approach, Russia can hardly see the EU, however much it is 
its largest trade partner, as a mighty actor, which really represents 
in world politics the exponential sum of its members. Thus neither 
European soft power nor indeed its internal divisions convey to 
the Kremlin this idea the way the United States does. 
Therefore the dialogue between the EU and Russia is strongly 
conditioned by the divergence of the dominant narratives. This 
clash of perceptions and understandings lies at the heart of the 
knot. 
Clashing perceptions: the dynamics of estrangement 
The EU and Russia disagree in their explanations of how we got 
here and tend to misinterpret the goals of the other. The question is 
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not only whether the EU understands Russia or not, but also 
whether Russia truly comprehends the EU. For years, Moscow has 
been insisting repeatedly on being treated as a normal 
partner/neighbour while constantly reiterating that Russia is a 
special actor. This self-perception clearly conflicts with the very 
rationale of the European project and explains why Russia 
couldn’t even envisage being just one among others in a European 
Neighbourhood Policy. 
The dominant perception among the European elites – 
somehow still under Gorbachev’s idea of a Common European 
Home − is that the EU has pursued a genuine commitment to 
progressive integration with Russia through the promotion of a 
peaceful space of shared prosperity with trade at its core. In 
Moscow, by contrast, an increasing disappointment has governed 
the official interpretation of the relationship and terms like 
‘humiliation’, ‘deception’ and ‘betrayal’ come forth recurrently. 
The landmarks of this perceived disloyalty are the NATO 
operation in Kosovo/Serbia, the expansions of the Alliance to 
include Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic in 1999 and the 
Baltic States in 2004, and finally the ‘color revolutions’ in the 
former Soviet space. The sum of it is what the influential Russian 
political scientist Sergey Karaganov calls a “Versailles with velvet 
gloves”1. 
While in the EU’s eyes the Eastern Partnership is an instrument 
that does not include the prospect of joining the European Union, 
for Moscow it represents a first step towards rapid integration into 
the EU that will, it presumes, be accompanied by membership in 
NATO. Brussels, along with most member states, has great 
problems understanding the existential fear the EU’s soft power in 
the post-Soviet space provokes in the Kremlin. From the 
Kremlin’s perspective, the ‘color revolutions’ are no more than a 
Western instrument for carrying out “post-modern coups d’état” in 
such a way that the role of local actors and the domestic roots of 
                                                     
1 S. Karaganov, “Europe and Russia: Preventing a New Cold War”, Russia in Global 
Affairs, 7 June 2014, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Europe-and-Russia-
Preventing-a-New-Cold-War-16701. 
16 Beyond Ukraine. EU and Russia in Search of a New Relation 
 
these phenomena are concealed. As Andrei Kortunov, the General 
Director of the Russian International Affairs Council, points out, 
“for Russia traditionally the term ‘soft power’ has had more bad 
connotations than good. For example, many see soft power as the 
West’s attempts to undermine Russian interests in various regions 
of the world by organizing ‘color revolutions’”2. Hence the wave 
of anti-government demonstrations in December 2011 and March 
2012 in St. Petersburg and Bolotnaya Square in Moscow in 
response to electoral fraud in the parliamentary elections and the 
announcement of Putin’s return to the Kremlin, could be 
interpreted by the Russian leader only as a challenge in both the 
internal and external dimensions. 
From the Russian perspective therefore, the past fifteen years 
are nothing but a succession of Western interferences in the 
Eurasian space and contempt for Russia’s attempts to seek a 
mutually satisfactory accommodation with the EU and NATO. 
Moscow’s profound irritation is rooted in the perception that the 
West ignores its role as hegemonic regional power in the post-
Soviet space. And, above all, the Kremlin is convinced that the 
West is implementing a strategy of regime change with 
geopolitical objectives that ultimately seek to usurp and break 
Russian power. These perceptions have led to the gradual 
hardening of Putin’s regime both inward and outward. Since Putin 
has been in charge, the Russian narrative is about restoration of 
power not emergence. 
The Charter of the United Nations states the principle of 
“sovereign equality of all its members”, a principle endorsed by 
Russia. But when Moscow appeals to the “principle of security 
indivisibility”, the implicit demand is the distinct recognition of its 
right to supervise and control its former Soviet neighbours as 
Russia’s “natural area of influence”. This use of the notion of 
‘natural’, applied to the post-Soviet space as a ground for self-
                                                     
2 Russia Direct “For Russia, soft power doesn’t have to mean being a softy”, 
interview with Andrei Kortunov and Marina Lebedeva, 17 March 2014, 
http://www.russia-direct.org/qa/russia-soft-power-doesn%E2%80%99t-have-
mean-being-softy. 
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explanatory legitimacy is recurrent in Russia’s discourse: for 
instance, Evgeny Vinokurov, Director of the Centre for Integration 
Studies, Eurasian Development Bank, claims that Russia has a 
“natural leading role in its regional integration bloc”3.  
Thus the central question in the EU-Russia dialogue, although 
not explicit as such, is whether these former Soviet neighbours 
actually enjoy full freedom and sovereignty. Has Moscow the 
right to govern their strategic direction? Or are we back to 
Brezhnev’s doctrine of “limited sovereignty”? Russian elites 
complain about the West lecturing them
4
 but one would hardly 
find any self-criticism about Russia’s arrogant attitudes towards 
the elites and the citizens of the former Soviet states which are 
supposed to be partners and peers... In many private conversations, 
Kyrgyz or Belarussian or Kazakh officials complain about Russian 
condescension when interacting with them. 
Misinterpretation and misunderstandings can be a disputable 
matter. Yet some facts don’t go away. Russia uses hard retaliation 
in its policy towards those of its former Soviet neighbours 
(Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia) that have annoyed the Kremlin: 
trade blockades, frozen conflicts, military occupation. But can 
anyone imagine the EU invading Armenia – or for that matter any 
other Eastern Partnership country – for not signing the Association 
Agreement in November 2013?  
Respect and fear are two central and intertwined values in the 
Russian understanding of power. Illustrative, for instance, is how 
S. Karaganov exemplifies in a Financial Times article
5
 the fact 
that “Russia is finding its place” in the world. Don’t expect the 
case of a social or economic development achievement: just 
                                                     
3 E. Vinokurov, “EU-Russia Economic Relations: Looking Ten Years Ahead”, 
World Finance Review, May 2014, pp. 12-13, http://www.worldfinancereview. 
com/2014/WFR_May_2014.pdf. 
4 F. Lukyanov, “The What-Not-To-Do List”, Berlin Policy Journal, 27 April 2015, 
http://berlinpolicyjournal.com/the-what-not-to-do-list/. 
5 S. Karaganov, “Western delusions triggered conflict and Russians will not yield”, 
The Financial Times, 14 September 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/ 
0/05770494-3a93-11e4-bd08-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3DmKXi5 
G9. 
18 Beyond Ukraine. EU and Russia in Search of a New Relation 
 
“compare the Soviet armed forces, lumbering and expensive, with 
the nimble military of modern Russia”. What else does the 
military parade in Moscow to commemorate on 9 May the World 
War II victory mean? What other message does Putin want to send 
to the world? La grandeur is back. 
Ukraine and Russia have made their choice 
The Ukrainian uprising is a product of home-grown developments 
and would have taken place mostly in the same way had the West 
supported it or not. Now Ukrainian citizens understand that their 
main fight is not military but political, the building of a 
sustainable democratic state. But the Kremlin’s strategy consists 
precisely in preventing such an outcome from happening. The 
Russian president made this clear during his speech at the NATO 
summit in Bucharest (April 2008) when he put the focus on 
Georgia and Ukraine. He categorised the latter as a “complex state 
formation” whose move closer to the Atlantic organisation could, 
according to the Russian leader, “put the state on the verge of its 
existence”. 
None of the main foreign actors – the EU, the US and Russia – 
envisioned the scope and determination of the Ukrainian citizens’ 
spontaneous mobilization. And in fact they have been quite slow 
to react. The EU had a few years of “Ukraine fatigue” albeit the 
signing of the association agreement in Vilnius was key due to the 
importance of Ukraine in the former Soviet Union and represented 
a milestone in a little buoyant neighbourhood policy. What the EU 
did not anticipate is the intensity of the Russian response. 
Meanwhile, for the United States, the task at that moment was to 
retreat from Europe and this crisis was not something that suited 
Washington. Neither for the US nor the EU, absorbed in their 
internal problems, has the Ukrainian crisis been timely. 
Moscow could explain Maidan only by resorting to the action 
of an external factor, namely foreign interference (the European 
Union and the United States). In its viewpoint the events in 
Ukraine could not be the expression of any autonomous will of the 
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people: someone else had to be pulling the strings. The Kremlin’s 
strategists managed to roll out a programme of disinformation that 
has gained traction even in the West. The three mantras of this 
strategy are: fascists and ultranationalists have carried out a coup 
d’état; this was achieved thanks to Western interference; and the 
rights, not to mention the physical safety, of Russian-speaking 
minorities are at risk. However the ultranationalists did not make 
their way to parliament, as the 2014 general elections showed, and 
the Russian language, which is also used by a large number of 
citizens who define themselves as Ukrainian, has never really been 
under threat in Ukraine. The glaring error of a proposal to 
derogate the 2012 law concerning the Russian language was 
reversed a few days later. In Ukraine, as in the majority of former 
Soviet states, Russian, Russian-speaking, and pro-Russian are 
three distinct realities that sometimes coincide, but often do not. 
As much as the Russian media and leadership may repeat it, the 
division in the country is neither ethnic nor linguistic, it is 
political. 
Ukraine has been the testing ground of the Kremlin’s resort to 
the Russian minorities in the former Soviet neighbourhood. 
Moscow considers all Russian speakers as their compatriots, a 
concept not included in the Russian Constitution
6
. But where it 
states that the Russian Federation “shall guarantee its citizens 
protection and patronage abroad” (Article 61.2), the Russian 
Foreign Policy Concept of February 2013
7
 speaks of “Russian 
citizens and compatriots residing abroad” and of “Russia’s 
approach to human right issues”. The logic of this approach is thus 
where my countrymen are I am in my right and makes it possible 
to activate, when convenient, a mechanism supported by what 
Moscow defines as its “legitimate interests”. On this foundation 
was built the strategy of the annexation of Crimea. 
                                                     
6 The Constitution of the Russian Federation, adopted on 12 December 1993, 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/articles/ConstMain.shtml. 
7 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Approved by President of the 
Russian Federation V. Putin on 12 February 2013, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4. 
nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D. 
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The conflict with Ukraine is especially illustrative in this respect. 
None of the economic arguments put forward by the Kremlin 
regarding the harm that the signing of the DCFTA (Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area) agreement by Kiev would imply 
for Russia actually have grounds, as many experts, even Russian, 
have substantiated. For example, Sergei Aleksashenko, a former 
Deputy Director of the Bank of Russia, explains that in fact 
“Ukraine could follow the example of Serbia, which is well on the 
way to becoming a member of the EU and has a free trade 
agreement with Russia. In reality, given a measure of political 
good will, the relationship between the DCFTA and CIS FTA can 
be adjusted to the benefit of both sides and especially of the three 
countries whose fortunes are most at stake in the tug of war 
between Russia and the EU”8. 
In an interview in November 2014, Novaya Gazeta asked Igor 
Yurgens whether there was any calculation of the consequences of 
                                                     
8 S. Aleksashenko, For Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia Free Trade with Europe and Russia 
is Possible, 3 July 2014, http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=56074. 
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the ‘Crimea is ours’ move and the interference in Ukrainian affairs 
and whether the economic price of such a move was considered. 
Yurgens, an influential policy adviser under Medvedev’s 
presidency, answered with bitterness: “You asked me about the 
calculations? The calculation was as follows: “Pride is more 
important than bread”. And so if we take Crimea then we will 
forget about the domestic problems, generate an upswing in public 
sentiment over the return of Crimea and Sevastopol – lands where 
Russian blood was spilled, where Tolstoj became Tolstoj and 
where Prince Vladimir was baptized. The calculations? Don’t 
worry, we’ll do them later, we have $500 billion in FX and gold 
reserves. Ukraine will fall apart. The West won’t attack a nuclear 
superpower. We’ll figure it out later”9. 
With Moscow’s direct intervention in the war in Ukraine, Putin 
has managed to ensure that the latter’s future lies, to a large extent, 
in his hands. But, by contrast, Russia’s position in Ukraine and its 
strategic options in the rest of the post-Soviet space have been 
weakened. In Ukraine, the Kremlin seeks strategic control of the 
country or, at least, to secure the capacity to block its foreign 
policy in the case of an eventual coming together with the EU or 
NATO. In this sense, Donbas is just an instrument. The 
‘decentralisation’ of Ukraine or the “national inclusive dialogue” 
arouses Putin’s interest only because of this goal and not in terms 
of Ukrainian domestic policy. The Kremlin’s ability to conceal its 
real objectives tends to profoundly distort the debates with and 
within the EU. The problem for Ukraine is that, until now, Donbas 
has been enough to force Kiev to accept the terms agreed in 
Minsk, but not to bend its will on maintaining its full sovereignty 
and freedom.  
In fact, Moscow seems to be toying with the idea that Kiev’s 
possible collapse, allied with Ukrainian disappointment at the lack 
of a solid deal with the EU, could end up changing the domestic 
political balance, leaving it more favourable to the Kremlin’s 
                                                     
9 I. Yurgens, “Развернуть страну назад невозможно” (It is impossible to turn the 
country back), Novaya Gazeta, 14 November 2014, http://www.novayagazeta.ru/ 
politics/66099.html. 
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interests. But the Kremlin, conditioned by its cognitive biases, 
may be proven very wrong. In a foreseeable future, Ukraine is lost 
from the Eurasian Union project. In the eyes of a majority of 
Ukrainian citizens, the Russian military intervention has 
completely transformed the frame of reference of its relationship 
with Russia.  
The EU’s and Russia’s inner weaknesses 
The EU’s main shortcoming lies in itself and more so within the 
member states, which have not been able to deploy a genuine 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and an EU energy 
policy. Thus much of the problem has come from its side since it 
has allowed Russia to take a reading very favourable to its own 
interests. The Kremlin, since Putin’s arrival to power, has rightly 
understood that interdependence in the energy field tilts the 
balance in its favour and that it can count on the division of EU 
member states not only for weakening the EU as a global political 
power but also for offering Russia the possibility to legitimately 
reach the most convenient bilateral agreements. If member 
countries such as Germany or Italy are ready to play the game why 
should the EU criticize Russia for it? 
Moreover, no issue has generated more divisions and 
controversy among and within the member states than Russia. For 
years – and in some cases up to now – some EU member states’ 
political and economic elites didn’t really shake off the inherited 
idea that Russia had special rights over Ukraine as elsewhere in 
the former Soviet area. This incapacity, of course, has not gone 
unnoticed in Moscow. The EU and its member states’ reading of 
Russia have proven to be inaccurate. They remained in the 
comfort zone of a standard-shaped policy. They were too 
confident in the progressive ‘Europeanization’ of Russia through 
trade and cooperation relations while trying to annoy Moscow as 
little as possible on political and human rights issues. It is worth 
mentioning, for instance, that the Common Strategy of the 
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European Union on Russia
10
, endorsed by the European Council in 
Cologne in June 1999, is the first initiative towards a third country 
that the EU launched after the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty. Tailoring for Russia the suit of a strategic partner without 
clearly addressing the substance that Moscow demanded has been 
nothing but a contribution to tying a Gordian knot. 
The debates on Russia (and the Ukrainian crisis) within the EU 
are also affected by a great mix of interests, opposing visions, 
stereotypes and disinformation. In order to overhaul the EU’s 
stance on Russia, there is a need for a better understanding of 
Moscow’s objectives and strategic approaches as well as of its 
perceptions. But the very fact that the EU member states have 
been able – precisely in spite of their divisions and internal tussles 
– to adopt a strategy of sanctions despite being aware of the fact 
they would also hurt their economic interests is something that 
Moscow hardly expected. 
Russia meanwhile is proud to be among the ascending stars of 
the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries. But a growing 
number of economists, both Russian and foreign, considers that in 
terms of growth rate, productivity, and investment security, 
comparison with Brazil, India and China leaves Russia far behind. 
For instance, the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development) figures of Russia’s level of GDP per capita and 
productivity in 2014
11
 show that it is below that of Greece, 
Portugal or Slovakia… Thus Russia’s economic situation is far 
from what would be expected of a great power. The Western 
sanctions or the drop in oil prices are not – by far – the only 
explanation. They have only accelerated the deterioration. The 
main reason is structural and lies in the absence of a real structural 
reform of the economy. 
                                                     
10 Common Strategy of the European Union of 4 June 1999 on Russia 
(1999/414/CFSP), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc 
_114137.pdf. 
11 OECD.StatExtracts, Level of GDP per capita and productivity, Data extracted on 10 
May 2015, 10:13 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat, https://stats.oecd.org/Index. 
aspx?DataSetCode=PDB_LV. 
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A report by the Institute for Economic Forecasting of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences, published in June 2013, warned 
that a clear trend to plummeting rates of economic growth was 
recorded: the GDP grew by 1 per cent in the first quarter of 2013, 
well below the forecast of the Russian Ministry of Economic 
Development. It signalled further that  
over the past two decades production output grew mostly thanks 
to over-exploitation of existing enterprises rather than building 
new ones. As a result, “new capacities are often needed just to 
keep the existing production output and to prevent it falling 
down because of the accelerated depreciation of completely 
obsolete capital assets. […] In contemporary Russia conditions 
only high rates of production growth provide for modernization 
of and qualitative changes in the economy”. Needed for these are 
massive innovations thirsty for large-scale and widespread 
investments which are practically unrealistic in a slowly growing 
transition economy
12
. 
In October 2014, the Russian Finance Minister warned about the 
impossibility of sustaining large military modernization plans
13
. 
Similarly, the highly respected Russian economist, Mikhail  
Dmitriyev, explains that 2014 “was the first year in the 21st 
century when the real incomes of Russians declined, and this trend 
will continue this year. January inflation was the highest since 
1999” and “energy exports will continue to decline as a percentage 
of GDP”14. And he stressed how Putin’s support defines itself in 
negative terms: “people can still approve of Putin, but the nature 
of the approval has shifted from positive motivation – approval of 
                                                     
12 Institute for Economic Forecasting, The New Economic Policy – The Policy of Economic 
Growth, Moscow 2013, http://russeurope.hypotheses.org/1411. Italics in the 
original. 
13 Reuters, Finance minister warns Russia can’t afford military spending plan, 7 October 
2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/07/us-russia-economy-spending-
defenceidUSKCN0HW1H420141007. 
14 M. Dmitriyev, “Predicting the Future with Russia’s Economic Nostradamus”, The 
Moscow Times, 18 March 2015, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/ 
article/predicting-the-future-with-russias-economic-nostradamus/517659.html. 
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achievements – to negative: approval due to the perception 
of foreign threats”. 
The Russian economy stagnated in 2014 and the OECD 
predicts (January 2015) that in 2015 its GDP will contract by 
almost 5 per cent and the country will enter recession. 
Additionally the flight of capital ($151bn in 2014, far above 
2013’s $61bn) is the result of a climate of distrust and the 
European sanctions. The decrease in Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) and the disruption of technology transfers should also be 
added to the mix. The improbable but necessary modernisation 
and diversification of the Russian economy will be even more 
difficult in a context of confrontation with the West. 
The economic impact of the military intervention in Ukraine 
also raises the question of whether Putin’s policy and actions are 
consistent with a clearly defined strategy. Having strong political 
will and firm convictions − Russia must be the hegemonic 
regional power and one of the leading poles in the global order − 
does not necessarily mean having a strategy − the adaptation of 
the means to achieve certain ends. Neither is it useful to confuse 
Putin’s tactical ability for mastering the international political 
moment with a strategy − undoubtedly facilitated by his executive 
capacity (i.e., concentration of power) when compared with the 
complex European decision-making process. 
The Kremlin’s expectations of improving the economic 
situation seem now to rest on a turn towards China, symbolised by 
the bilateral agreement signed in May 2014. No doubt the 
strengthening of relations with China makes strategic sense. But 
the moment chosen, including the rush to close lengthy 
negotiations that had been underway for years, was due above all 
to Putin’s interest in showing that he was not internationally 
isolated. In the best-case scenario, Russia/Gazprom will be 
exporting 38 billion cubic metres of gas a year to China by 2030. 
That is to say, about a third of what it exported to the European 
market in 2013 and, it is to be expected, at a notably lower price. 
Another of Russia’s structural weakness lies precisely in what 
appears to be its strength, which is the concentration of political 
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and economic power in the hands of the state and, in the last 
instance, in the hands of just one person and his inner circle. 
Putin’s government has spawned a de-institutionalisation of the 
system which will end up undermining the country’s ability to act 
within the complex structures of globalisation. Putin’s era presents 
a discouraging balance: capitalism monopolized by a state that is 
not required to be accountable, institutions in name only – Justice 
in particular –, omnipresent corruption and a virtually feudal 
relationship between the ruler and the ruled. President Putin may 
now be at the acme of his popularity but how long will he be able 
to maintain this new national mobilization against the West if 
living standards deteriorate further?  
What chances for coexistence 
The EU engaging Russia through cooperation with the Eurasian 
Union (as Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard suggest
15
) could be one 
good option, provided that the latter actually delivers and that 
internal conflicts among partners do not disrupt their integration 
process. Yet the chances for this to work out would be much 
stronger if Russia’s main concern were actually grounded on 
economic development interests. But now, after Ukraine, this has 
to be proven and in the very first place to its own partners who 
have made evident that they are very sensitive about their own 
sovereignty, regardless of their similarities as political regimes. 
The Eurasian Union project has been seriously weakened not 
only by the loss of Ukraine, but by the fears that Russian military 
intervention has raised in the other two key members, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan. According to the idea launched by Putin in October 
2011, the project was inspired by other regional integration 
processes such as the European Union, the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) or the Association of Southeast Asian 
                                                     
15 I. Krastev, M. Leonard, The New European Disorder, European Council for Foreign 
Affairs, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR117_TheNewEuropeanDisorder_ESSAY.pdf. 
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Nations (ASEAN) and aspired to be “an essential part of Greater 
Europe united by shared values of freedom, democracy, and 
market laws”
16
. However, in the light of the war in Ukraine, it has 
acquired a neo-imperialist, ethnic dimension that provokes 
uncertainty and a barely concealed fear in the other members. This 
largely explains the growing reluctance of Minsk and Astana to 
further deepen the process of integration and their rejection of any 
step that could include a political dimension. There is very serious 
concern in Minsk and Kazakhstan about the Kremlin’s policy 
regarding territorial integrity and the use of the russkiy mir idea. 
Moreover it casts doubt on the validity of the formally recognised 
borders (1994 Memorandum of Budapest
17
). It is probably not by 
chance that the Belarussian president Lukashenko was not present 
at the main military parade in Moscow last 9 May. 
Domestic political strategy, i.e. regime preservation, is the 
decisive factor for Putin’s decisions – not rational choice, be it 
economic or security driven. While the nature of power in the 
Kremlin remains unchanged, the European Union must seriously 
revise its strategy towards Russia. What if a conflict arises 
between Belarus and Russia? What Dmitri Trenin wrote more than 
ten years ago still fully applies: “Russia’s rapprochement with 
Europe is only in the second instance a foreign policy exercise. Its 
success or failure will primarily depend on the pace and depth of 
Russia’s economic, political and societal transformation. Russia’s 
‘entry into Europe’ cannot be negotiated with Brussels. It has to be 
first ‘made in Russia’ itself”18. This will happen in the long run 
but this perspective should never be abandoned. 
                                                     
16 Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, “A new integration project for Eurasia: The future 
in the making”, Izvestia, 3 October 2011, http://www.russianmission.eu/en/news/article-
prime-minister-vladimir-putin-new-integration-project-eurasia-future-making-izvestia-3-. 
17 UN Document A/49/765, Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with 
Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/49/765. 
18 D. Trenin, A Russia within-Europe: Working towards a New Security 
Arrangement, CEPS ESF Working Paper, no. 6, March 2002, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=22252. 
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European unity, currently inseparable from the leadership of 
Chancellor Merkel, rests on fragile foundations and will be put to 
the test whether the Minsk truce fails or not. So within the 
framework of developing a new EU foreign policy strategy and 
the revision of the neighbourhood policy, including the Eastern 
Partnership, an in-depth discussion in Brussels on how to address 
relations with Russia and its neighbours becomes an urgent 
necessity. It would be wise not to repeat what in 1994 Peter van 
Hamm already identified as a serious mistake, namely the 
inclination of the Western governments to adopt a Moscow-
centred approach and “with a few exceptions consider Soviet 
successor states in terms of those states’ relations with Russia”19. 
A democratic Ukraine would be a denial of Putinism: it would 
demonstrate that there is no such thing as an Eastern Slavic 
specialness that endows with legitimacy a model of democracy 
specific to some Russian tradition. Hence supporting Ukraine in 
laying the ground for a functional and sustainable rule of law is 
also one of the more coherent ways to pave the ground for a 
democratic future for Russia and for a more stable European 
security order. The European Union has now acquired towards 
Ukraine a responsibility that was certainly not on its agenda, for 
all Russia’s claims to the contrary. Business as usual is gone for a 
long time. Ukraine now is a key test for the EU’s credibility in its 
European neighbourhood and for its ability to conceive a way to 
coexist and interact with contemporary Russia without losing its 
very raison d’être. 
                                                     
19 P. van Ham, Ukraine, Russia and European security: implications for Western policy, Chaillot 
Paper, no. 13, 1 February 1994, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp013e.pdf. 
2. EU-Russia: What Went Wrong?  
Aldo Ferrari 
According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine 
crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression. […] 
But this account is wrong: the United States and its European 
allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis
1
. 
These words, written by a leading U.S. scholar, can be considered 
the necessary starting point for the resumption of relations 
between Russia and the West, particularly the EU. In fact the idea 
that the responsibility of the deterioration of these relations 
completely depends on Moscow appears largely groundless and 
affects not only the correct awareness of reality but above all the 
possibility of finding a way out. The resumption of political 
cooperation between Russia and the West (particularly the 
European Union) should begin with the understanding that the 
present-day Ukrainian crisis is the latest result of a deep and 
growing mutual misunderstanding. After the end of the USSR 
both Russia and the West have been disappointed in their hopes 
regarding the counterparty. Moscow expected that, after the 
ideological confrontation that characterized the Cold War, the 
West  would have looked to Russia without suspicion, in a spirit 
of complete trust and strategic cooperation. Which is clearly not 
the case. On the other hand, Russia did not set itself on the path of 
                                                     
1 J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault. The Liberal 
Delusions That Provoked Putin”, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2004, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-
ukraine-crisis-is-the-wests-fault?cid=nlc-foreign_affairs_this_week-090414why_the_ 
ukraine_crisis_is_the_5090414&sp_mid=46900441&sp_rid=YWxkby5mZXJyYXJp
QHVuaXZlLml0S0. 
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effective Westernization of social and political life, remaining 
deeply affected by the Tsarist and Soviet legacy
2
. But, above all, 
the expansion of the European Union and NATO eastward 
occurred in stark contrast to the political will of Moscow
3
, 
impacting very negatively on the development of relations 
between Russia and the West. 
The EU and Russia after the collapse of the USSR 
The idea proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev in the last years of the 
USSR of a “common European home” extended from the Atlantic 
to the Urals and based on the establishment of a new climate of 
trust soon proved illusory. In the early 1990s, under the leadership 
of President Yeltsin, the Russian Federation for a few years 
seemed to want a rapprochement with Western political and 
economic structures. Nevertheless the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, once regained their full sovereignty, were clearly 
wary of the post-Soviet Russia and firmly oriented towards the 
West. The EU and NATO supported this orientation and accepted 
them  progressively between 1999 and 2004 (including the three 
Baltic States, which had been part of the USSR). 
The pro-Western orientation was rapidly abandoned by 
Moscow, but produced some important steps. In particular, Russia 
intensified relations with Western countries and their 
organizations. In 1993 Russia developed with the EU the 
negotiations on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA). This agreement was signed in June 1994, but came into 
force only in 1997. The agreement formalized regular political 
dialogue at various levels and promoted the legislative 
                                                     
2 A. Moshes, EU-Russia relations: unfortunate continuity, Foundation Robert Schumann, 
European Issues, no. 129, 24 February 2009, http://www.robert-
schuman.eu/en/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-129-en.pdf. 
3 And even with the promises, unwritten but explicit, made by Western leadership to 
Gorbachev at the end of the Soviet era. See S. Romano, Ucraina, una crisi post-sovietica, 
in A. Colombo, P. Magri (eds.), In mezzo al guado. Scenari globali e l’Italia, Rapporto 
ISPI 2015, http://www.ispionline.it/it/EBook/RapportoISPI2015.pdf, pp. 51-52. 
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convergence of Russia with the long-term goal of establishing a 
free trade area. In 2002 the EU recognized Russia the status of a 
‘market economy’, a step that strengthened the candidacy of the 
country to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
4
. 
In this period, under the two consecutive presidencies of 
Vladimir Putin, Russia returned to play a leading role in the 
international system through the internal stabilization and 
consistent economic growth, however largely depending on the 
high price of oil. Moreover, economic integration and 
interdependence between Russia and the EU had grown 
considerably. Russia is currently the third largest trading partner 
of the EU after the United States and China. 
According to data from the Russian Federal Statistics Service, 
in 2013 EU Member States accounted for 57 per cent of Russian 
exports and 46.5 per cent of Russian imports, making the Union 
by far Russia’s most significant trading partner. In turn, Russia is 
the EU’s third largest trading partner, accounting for 9.5 per cent 
of EU trade. A number of Europe’s largest economies continue to 
have significant bilateral trade with Russia, with the Netherlands 
($52.1bn), Germany ($46.7bn), and Italy ($34.3bn) reporting the 
largest trade volumes in the first half of 2014
5
. 
Therefore, the prospects of cooperation between the EU and 
Russia are extremely promising, but at the same time affected by 
elements of mutual distrust and misunderstanding. 
The European expansion eastward 
Despite a steady increase in economic cooperation, Russia and the 
EU have shown so far divergent political views, in particular with 
                                                     
4 S. Giusti, Europa e Russia/1. Perché è così difficile capirsi, in A. Ferrari (ed.), Oltre la 
Crimea.  Russia contro Europa?, ISPI, Milano 2014, pp. 72-73, http://www. 
ispionline.it/it/EBook/OltreLaCrimea.pdf. 
5 House of Lords, European Union Committee 6th Report of Session 2014-15,  The 
EU and Russia: before and beyond the crisis in Ukraine, Hl Paper 115, 20 February 2015, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldeucom/115/115. 
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regard to the reorganization of the Eastern European and Southern 
Caucasus countries of the post-Soviet space. Since  the end of the 
USSR, the European Union – in concert with the United States 
and NATO – has in fact pursued a policy of political and military 
expansion eastward that Moscow has always considered 
threatening and unjustified in light of the absence of the 
ideological and strategic danger previously constituted by the 
Communist system
6
. In fact, since the end of the USSR Western 
policy toward Russia has seen at the same time the establishment 
of forms of dialogue with the activation of a new containment 
strategy. A policy strongly influenced by the perception of the US 
strategic need to avoid “the reemergence of a Eurasian empire that 
could obstruct the American geostrategic goal”7. A decisive 
moment in this process was the enlargement in 2004, the largest 
single expansion of the European Union, which involved four 
countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) that 
had been members of the Warsaw Pac, as well as the three Baltic 
republics (Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia). All these countries (with 
Romania and Bulgaria) were already members of NATO, a 
military alliance created to deal with the Soviet Union and that 
Moscow perceives as a threat for its national security. We should 
not forget that the enlargement of the EU is closely linked with the 
expansion of NATO. And this not only in the Russian perception. 
As written by John Mearsheimer, “The taproot of the trouble is 
NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to 
move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West. 
At the same time, the EU’s expansion eastward and the West’s 
backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine – beginning 
with the Orange Revolution in 2004 – were critical elements, 
too”8. Of course Mearsheimer’s stance is not shared by the 
                                                     
6 For the Russian interpretation of this expansion in the first post-Soviet decade see 
S. Rogov, M. Nossov, La Russia e l’allargamento della NATO, in M. de Leonardis (ed.), 
La nuova NATO: i membri, le strutture, i compiti, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2001, pp. 183-202. 
7 Z. Brzeziński, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, 
Basic Books, New York 1997, p. 87.  
8 J. Mearsheimer (2004).  
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majority of Western observers, but his political realism is very 
appropriate in such a complicated situation. 
Besides, after the great enlargement of 2004, the EU had 
stepped up its expansion in the post-Soviet space through the 
project of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). This project 
is born in 2004, with the strategic objective to unite under a single 
set the post-Soviet countries that have become ‘new neighbors’ of 
the EU (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, 
Belarus). The European Commission has always said it wants to 
develop the ENP in parallel with the strategic partnership with 
Moscow, but failed to persuade Russia. Also because of  the start 
of the ENP coincided with the so-called ‘color revolutions’, which 
involved two of these countries, namely Georgia and Ukraine, and 
raised serious concerns in Russia
9
. Moscow, in fact, accused the 
West of the organization of these regime changes, fearing to be 
involved. Therefore, Russia began to vigorously confront the 
whole process of expansion eastward of the EU, considered as 
substantially aggressive. Moscow seemed completely unable to 
understand that its political and economic model appears scarcely 
attractive for many countries of former USSR, namely Moldova, 
Georgia and in a certain measure Ukraine. This is indeed the main 
obstacle for the Russian projects of reconstruction of post-Soviet 
space. 
The following years saw then a progressive increase in political 
misunderstandings between Russia and the EU. The strengthening 
of the ENP through the so-called Eastern Partnership (EaP) has 
helped to deepen this misunderstanding. The EaP stems from a 
joint Polish-Swedish proposal of June 2008 to improve relations 
with the neighboring countries of Eastern Europe, Southern 
Caucasus and Southern Mediterranean. Given the traditional anti-
Russian stance of Poland and Sweden, Russian suspicions that 
EaP aims at definitively removing from Moscow the countries of 
Eastern Europe and South Caucasus cannot be considered 
groundless. 
                                                     
9 D. Ó Beacháin, A. Polese, The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes 
and failures, Routledge, Oxford-New York, 2010. 
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As Mearsheimer noted,  
The EU, too, has been marching eastward. In May 2008, it 
unveiled its Eastern Partnership initiative, a program to foster 
prosperity in such countries as Ukraine and integrate them into 
the EU economy. Not surprisingly, Russian leaders view the 
plan as hostile to their country’s interests. This past February, 
before Viktor Yanukovych was forced to flee, Russian Foreign 
Minister, Sergei Lavrov, accused the EU of trying to create a 
‘sphere of influence’ in eastern Europe. In the eyes of Russian 
leaders, EU expansion is a Trojan horse for NATO expansion
10
. 
In 2008 the decision of some European countries (among them 
France, Great Britain, Germany and Italy) to recognize the 
independence of Kosovo was strongly opposed by Moscow, 
worried about the possible consequences on Caucasian 
secessionism. Then, at the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 
2008, the United States proposed, with the support of Poland and 
Great Britain, the opening of the Membership Action Plan to 
Ukraine and Georgia. Some major countries of ‘old Europe’ – 
especially Germany and France, but also Italy and Spain – 
succeeded in preventing this dangerous step.  
In the aftermath of this summit Anatol Lieven observed that the 
Bush administration’s push for an immediate offer of a NATO 
membership action plan to Georgia and Ukraine at the NATO 
summit in Bucharest has been blocked, which is good […] it is 
hard to see what conceivable rational calculation could support the 
extension of NATO membership to two new countries, one of 
them (Georgia) involved in unsolved civil war, and the other 
(Ukraine) with a population a large majority of which opposes 
NATO membership. And this is called ‘spreading democracy’?11. 
The question of NATO expansion eastwards was aggravated by 
the fact that in 2008 Poland and the Czech Republic agreed to the 
request to host on their territories the US anti-missile system. The 
worst moment of the relationship between Russia and the EU (as 
                                                     
10 J. Mearsheimer (2004).  
11 A. Lieven, “Three Faces of Infantilism: NATO’s Bucharest Summit”, in National 
Interest, 4 April 2008, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=17298. 
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well as the US) before today’s Ukrainian crisis was reached in 
August 2008, with the short but dangerous Russian-Georgian war. 
At the end of the conflict, Russia recognized the breakaway 
republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, this way contradicting 
its previous policy of rejection of all forms of political separatism. 
The Russian-Georgian war of August was indeed “… the largest 
crisis to date in Russia’s relationship with the West; some have 
even come to realize that the Georgian war of 2008 may be the 
most significant challenge to European Security since the Cold 
War’s end”
12
. 
Russia and the post-Soviet space 
From the Russian point of view, the key feature of the first post-
Soviet decade has been the persistent and largely successful 
attempt by the United States and the European Union to penetrate 
inside the geopolitical vacuum created by the collapse of the 
USSR. At least since 1993, Moscow has consistently challenged 
this policy of western expansion, opposing a quite different vision, 
stating its specific interests and priorities, claiming in particular: a) 
the functions of peacekeeping and defense of national minorities, 
in particular Russian-speaking, throughout the so called ‘near 
abroad’
13
; b) the maintenance of stability in the entire territory of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the formation 
of a band of  security along the Russian borders; c) a special role 
within the CIS
14
.  
                                                     
12 S.E. Cornell, J. Popjanevski, N. Nilsson, Russia’s War in Georgia: Causes and Implications for Georgia and the 
World, Policy Paper, August 2008, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Study Program, 
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14 D. Danilov, Russia’s Search for an International Mandate in Transcaucasia, in B. Coppetiers (ed.), Contested 
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During the first decade after the fall of USSR Russia could not, 
however, oppose the expansion eastwards of the EU and NATO, 
which led to the insertion in those structures of almost all the 
satellite countries of the former communist bloc and the three 
Baltic that had been part of the USSR. The economic and political 
strengthening under Putin’s leadership did not change the strategic 
direction and the interests of Moscow, but Russia could become 
more assertive. The guiding principle of the Russian policy is the 
notion of a ‘privileged sphere’ of influence in the post-Soviet 
space, often called Eurasia. It is clear that the post-Soviet 
countries of Eastern Europe – Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus – but 
also the three South Caucasus republics (Georgia, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan), are the main object of geopolitical contention 
between Russia and the European Union, while those of Central 
Asia respond to other dynamics. According to Moscow the EaP is 
in fact a strategy to co-opt the ex-Soviet republics in the European 
area. This results in a real competition for control of the post-
Soviet space between the European project and the Russian one. 
Russia definitely intends to preserve its influence on the same 
countries where the EU wants to spread its system of values. 
Moscow has indeed a multipolar vision of the international system 
in which each pole should be able to lead the surrounding area 
both through the soft power (culture, language, common history) 
and coercive instruments up to armed intervention, as seen in 
Georgia in 2008
15
. 
Already in 2006, for example, the important analyst Vladimir 
Degoev had written:  
The West should know that Russia has and will always have 
some vital interests in the South Caucasus  [...] There are also 
historical and geographical circumstances that do not allow 
Russia to be indifferent to what happens in Georgia, Azerbaijan 
and Armenia. In any case, the United States and Europe will 
understand of what we speak [...]. In principle, both Russia and 
the West have the same objective in the South Caucasus, namely 
the achievement of peace, stability and well-being [...]. However 
                                                     
15 S. Giusti, La Proiezione esterna della Federazione Russa, Pisa, ETS, 2012, pp. 83-108.  
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there is a paradox: if  in the Caucasus Russia will have as 
southern neighbors the European Union and NATO, then in this 
region there will never be the hoped peace
16
. 
These words – brutal but clear, referring to the South Caucasus, 
but applicable to the whole Near Abroad – effectively show the 
very assertive attitude of Russia against the expansion eastwards 
of both NATO and EU. The Russian-Georgian war has clearly 
demonstrated that Moscow is ready to use force to maintain 
control over its sphere of influence. In this sense what happened in 
Ukraine was entirely predictable. The former Soviet space 
embodies for Russia a significant part of its historical identity and 
strategic perspective; therefore the conflict about the EaP appears 
inevitable. In fact post-Soviet Russia has been engaged for years 
in the creation of several organizations in part inspired by those of 
the West. This path of institutionalization began soon after the 
dissolution of the USSR with the creation of the CIS that in reality 
has always been less than effective. The formal involvement of the 
former Soviet republics in a common sphere of security is based 
on the Collective Security Treaty (1992), which was followed by 
the creation in 2002 of the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO), which includes Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (since 2006). In the 
economic sphere the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) 
has been founded in 2000. As a matter of fact Moscow uses its 
weight to induce other post-Soviet countries to join these 
organizations on a certainly not egalitarian basis. 
Between Georgia and Ukraine 
After the serious crisis caused by the Russian-Georgian war, the 
tension between Brussels and Moscow seemed to diminish, also 
                                                     
16 V. Degoev, Rossija, Kavkaz i post-sovetskij mir [Russia, the Caucasus and Post-Soviet 
world], Russkaja panorama, Moskva, 2006, pp. 245-246. 
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thanks to the so-called reset in the relations between the US and 
Russia following the election of Barack Obama
17
.   
In those years the Russian recognition of the responsibility of 
the Soviet Union in the Katyn massacre contributed to the partial 
improvement of relations with Poland, which has an important 
role in European policy towards Moscow. Moreover, the 
economic crisis pushed the EU to preserve the important ties with 
a strategic partner like Russia 
Despite this partial improvement, some fundamental 
differences still remained in the years between the Georgian and 
Ukrainian crises. Russia sees EU as a largely disorganized 
political construction. For this reason Moscow continues to favor 
bilateral relations with individual EU member states and is 
accused of practicing against EU a classical policy of “divide and 
rule”. It is a consideration at least partially correct, although in 
reality Moscow merely exploits the divisions existing among 
European member states. 
To fully understand the evolution of relations between the EU 
and Russia we should also consider the growing distance in terms 
of values. In addition to the geopolitical contrast in recent years 
Russia is in fact becoming a kind of conservative pole opposed to 
most recent European social and legal developments. 
Even before the crisis in Ukraine Putin had clearly indicated 
the gap with the West in terms of values while launching a 
conservative ideological campaign. Some observers have even 
referred to a ‘cultural war’ by Putin18, which had an important 
point in the speech made by the Russian president on 19 
September at the final plenary meeting of the Valdai Club, the 
international forum that brings together politicians, Russian 
analysts and civil society from Russia and abroad. On this 
occasion, as well as tackling a series of specifically political 
                                                     
17 M. Del Pero, Usa-Russia: dal “reset” a una nuova Guerra fredda?, in A. Ferrari (ed.), 
Oltre la Crimea. Russia contro Europa?, ISPI, Milano 2014, p. 72-73, 
http://www.ispionline.it/it/EBook/OltreLaCrimea.pdf. 
18 Cf. D. Clark, Vladimir Putin’s culture war, 8 September 2013, 
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topics, Putin also spoke about themes with a social and even a 
moral dimension: “We can see how many of the Euro-Atlantic 
countries are actually rejecting their roots, including the Christian 
values that constitute the basis of Western civilisation. They are 
denying moral principles and all traditional identities: national, 
cultural, religious and even sexual. They are implementing 
policies that equate large families with same-sex partnerships, 
belief in God with the belief in Satan”19. 
Putin reiterated many similar arguments also in the speech to 
the Federal Assembly on 12 December 2013, which contains these 
significant words: 
We know that there are more and more people in the world who 
support our position on defending traditional values that have 
made up the spiritual and moral foundation of civilisation in 
every nation for thousands of years: the values of traditional 
families, real human life, including religious life, not just 
material existence but also spirituality, the values of humanism 
and global diversity. Of course, this is a conservative position. 
But speaking in the words of Nikolai Berdyaev, the point of 
conservatism is not that it prevents movement forward and 
upward, but that it prevents movement backward and downward, 
into chaotic darkness and a return to a primitive state
20
. 
On the basis of these indications the discussed Minister of Culture 
Vladimir Medinsky drafted a document entitled Materials and 
proposals for a project of the bases of a cultural policy of the 
state, which can be considered a kind of document of the new 
ideological orientation of Putin’s Russia. This document rejects, 
for example, the western principles of multiculturalism and 
tolerance. 
Without denying the right of any nation to preserve its 
ethnographic identity, we consider unacceptable the imposition 
of values alien to the Russian society. No reference to ‘creative 
freedom’ and ‘national identity’ cannot justify a behavior 
                                                     
19 Vladimir Putin Meets with Members the Valdai International Discussion Club. Transcript of 
the Speech and Beginning of the Meeting, http://valdaiclub.com/politics/62880.html. 
20 http://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/19825. 
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unacceptable from the point of view of Russian traditional 
values. [...] At the same time, the term ‘tolerance’ in its modern 
sense does not allow a clear separation between the racial, ethnic 
and religious intolerance and intolerance to social phenomena 
that are alien and dangerous from the point of view of Russian 
society and its inherent values, which leads to inappropriate use 
of the term ‘tolerance’ for the purposes of state cultural policy
21
. 
This ideological line is not shared by a large part of Russian public 
opinion
22
 and puts Russia in growing contrast with Europe and the 
United States, as demonstrated by the decision of many Western 
leaders to boycott the Sochi Winter Olympic Games took place in 
early February 2014.  
As a matter of fact, such a conservative evolution increased the 
gap between Russia and the European Union, but the contrast on 
the political evolution of the post-Soviet countries remains the 
more controversial issue. The EaP has continued to develop with 
ever more ambitious goals, in particular as far as concerns the 
creation of a free trade area through an Association Agreement. 
This project, is clearly not welcome by Moscow. Already during 
the press conference at the conclusion of the EU-Russia Summit in 
Khabarovsk (May 2009) Russian President, Dmitrij Medvedev, 
made clear his doubts: “But, frankly speaking, what embarrasses 
me is the fact that some states view this partnership as a 
partnership against Russia […] I don’t mean, of course, the EU 
leadership and our partners that sit at this table. I am talking about 
other states, but we don’t want the Eastern Partnership to turn into 
a partnership against Russia”23. 
But, above all, in the years of his third term as president Putin 
has stepped up very assertive efforts to re-composition of the post-
Soviet space. This economic and political reconstruction shaping 
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22 L. Ševcova, Valdajskaja doktrina Putina [Putin’s Valdai Doctrine], http://carnegie.ru/2013/09/23 
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is based primarily on the Eurasian Customs Union (EACU), 
established in 2010 by Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus
24
. Behind 
the Eurasian Customs Union is foreshadowed a more ambitious 
project, which aims not only to strengthen economic ties between 
the members, but also to promote a future political integration. In 
fact, the link between economics and politics is very strong in the 
projects of Eurasian reconstruction and in recent years Moscow 
has exerted strong pressure on other countries to get them to 
participate. Because of its delicate geopolitical situation Armenia 
agreed to join the Eurasian Customs Union already in September 
2013
25
. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are also subjected to similar 
pressure, but just like Armenia they have a relative political and 
economic importance. The decisive match for the success of the 
Eurasian project was played instead in Ukraine. Without this 
country the European dimension of this project would be 
insufficient. Ukraine is in fact the main bone of contention 
between the EU and Russia in their respective political projection. 
The pressure to extend the Eurasian Customs Union to Ukraine 
were exercised from Moscow just at the moment when the EU 
offered this country the Association Agreement. Therefore, the 
Ukrainian crisis was perfectly predictable and could have been 
avoided with a more prudent policy. As noted by Henry Kissinger,  
The West must understand that, to Russia, Ukraine can never be 
just a foreign country. Russian history began in what was called 
Kievan-Rus. The Russian religion spread from there. Ukraine 
has been part of Russia for centuries, and their histories were 
intertwined before then. Some of the most important battles for 
Russian freedom, starting with the Battle of Poltava in 1709, 
were fought on Ukrainian soil. The Black Sea Fleet – Russia’s 
means of projecting power in the Mediterranean – is based by 
long-term lease in Sevastopol, in Crimea. Even such famed 
dissidents as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Joseph Brodsky 
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25 Cf. N. Gegelashvili, The Vilnius Summit: Armenian Dimension, 17 December 
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insisted that Ukraine was an integral part of Russian history and, 
indeed, of Russia
26
. 
Although it is doubtful that the subordination to the domestic 
politics can be considered the main basis of the EU stance towards 
Ukraine, Kissinger’s demand for more realistic and concrete 
priorities certainly looks sharable. 
Conclusion and policy implications 
For over twenty years Russia and the European Union have had 
very different and substantially conflicting strategies towards the 
post-Soviet Eastern Europe and South Caucasus countries. The 
European vision of its own non-aggressive expansion eastwards is 
not shared by Moscow, while Europe does not accept the Russian 
will to maintain some form of control over the post-Soviet 
territories. The different assessment of the ‘color revolutions’, the 
contrast on the missile installations in Eastern Europe, the 
Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008, the opposing political 
project regarding post-Soviet states gradually strengthened a sharp 
contrast that exploded at the end of 2013 in Ukraine. 
Despite the growing economic interdependence, the EU and 
Russia have not so far been able to find lasting forms of political 
understanding based on the real acceptance of differences in 
interests and values. The competition for the post-Soviet space 
represents the most serious threat to the further development of the 
partnership between Brussels and Moscow, which is of paramount 
importance to both. As a matter of fact the severity of the Ukraine 
crisis imposes a profound rethinking of the relationship between 
the EU and Russia. 
The future of the post-Soviet countries of Eastern Europe and 
the South Caucasus should be defined with a much more shared  
involvement of all the interested actors. In particular, the EU 
                                                     
26 “Henry Kissinger: To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end”, The Washington Post, 5 March 
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should take a deep reflection on its strategy towards the Eastern 
Partnership and consider more carefully the consequences of some 
delicate political decisions. In the post-Soviet countries the weight 
of history and the determination of Russia to defend its interests 
must be seriously taken into account.  
On the other hand, despite the strategic relevance of the 
acquisition of the Crimea and the high internal consensus, Russia 
should feel strongly motivated to get out of this situation of 
political isolation and progressive economic decline. As a matter 
of fact Moscow needs to recover and expand its partnership with 
Europe and the West. The Eastern alternative is in fact dangerous 
for the Russians, no less than for us. 
Therefore, however hard it may seem, the European political 
project and the Russian one must be complementary, not opposed. 
For the good of the involved countries, but also for the recovery 
and consolidation of the Russian-European strategic relations.
3. After Maidan: 
Re-Starting NATO-Russia Relations 
Luca Ratti 
This chapter discusses NATO-Russia relations in the wider 
context of the post-Cold War European security debate. While 
evaluating the causes of their progressive deterioration, it also sets 
out a few basic suggestions towards an improvement in mutual 
understanding. The chapter argues that, while as a result of the 
2013 Euromaidan revolution, relations between the alliance and 
Moscow reached their post-Cold War nadir, the current dispute is 
only the latest chapter of a crisis that began in the early 2000s, 
when calls for NATO’s enlargement to former Soviet bloc states 
and the ‘color revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan 
exposed unresolved strategic differences between the West and 
Moscow. Nonetheless, its more distant origins have to be found in 
the nature of the 1989-1990 East-West settlement that left un-
clarified the role of the Soviet Union and of its successor states, 
thus generating reciprocal diffidence and conflicting perceptions 
of the post-Cold War European security architecture. 
The tension between the Atlantic Alliance and Russia that was 
triggered by the Maidan demonstrations in Kiev is the latest 
outburst of a protracted strategic dispute between the West and 
Moscow. The causes of this dispute can be found in the former 
Soviet space’s unresolved collocation in the European security 
architecture. This issue was not addressed in the settlement that 
between 1989 and 1990 brought the Cold War to an end: while 
following the demise of the East-West division the alliance called 
for the creation of a Europe that is ‘whole and free’ and attempted 
to engage Moscow, those efforts were not backed by a 
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comprehensive clarification of the former Soviet space’s 
collocation within the European security order, giving NATO-
Russia relations a schizophrenic character. Although the descent 
into a new Cold War is not a foregone conclusion, the current 
crisis proves that, without a solution to this fundamental issue, the 
alliance and Moscow might continue to drift apart. While the 
European Union appears unable to play any meaningful role in the 
current strategic setting, the alliance retains a powerful incentive 
to rediscover the mantra of the 1967 Harmel Report and to engage 
Moscow in comprehensive negotiations about a shattered post-
Cold War security architecture. 
The roots of NATO-Russia grievances (1989-1991) 
Relations between NATO and Russia plummeted in the aftermath 
of the 2013 Euromaidan revolution in Kiev with the Russian 
Federation rapidly securing control of Crimea and a violent armed 
conflict between Russian-backed separatists and the new 
Ukrainian government erupting in the mineral-rich Donbass 
region. Although after the collapse of the first Minsk protocol of 
September 2014, the second Minsk agreement of February 2015 
temporarily succeeded in bringing hostilities in Eastern Ukraine to 
an end, Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and 
increasing support for separatist forces in the Donetsk and 
Luhansk People’s Republics during the spring and the summer 
confirmed that the former Soviet space’s collocation in the 
European political order has become a fundamental source of 
contention between the alliance and the Kremlin to enforce 
conflicting strategic visions on issues that were left unresolved 
after the demise of the East-West division. More specifically, 
these events are the latest manifestations of an underlying tension 
which first erupted in the early 2000s, when a wave of protests in 
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, together with Washington’s 
calls for NATO’s ongoing enlargement to the former Soviet space, 
were viewed in Moscow as a betrayal of commitments that the 
West had undertaken in 1989-1990.  
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Then, as the Federal Republic of Germany pressed with 
American support for a fast-track towards unification – following 
chancellor Helmut Kohl’s abrupt announcement at the end of 
November 1989 of a ten-point programme towards the creation of 
confederative structures in Germany – Soviet leaders called for the 
establishment of new European institutions from the Atlantic to 
the Urals and for the creation of a “common European home” that 
would overcome the continent’s division, while containing a 
reunited German state
1
. While striking a chord with Britain and 
France and with part of the West German government, particularly 
Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, the Kremlin’s proposals 
were rejected by the United States, which perceived a pan-
European institution as too preponderant for securing a 
multilateral governance of Germany and the preservation of the 
transatlantic link. By contrast, Washington, with the Federal 
government’s support, demanded Moscow’s consent to a united 
Germany’s unrestricted membership in NATO, while providing 
the Kremlin with vague assurances that the alliance’s jurisdiction 
would not be shifted eastward from its present position
2
. As 
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suggested by then NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner, 
Germany would remain a full member of the alliance and of its 
military structure, while a special military status would be granted 
to the former GDR’s territory without leading to its neutralization 
or demilitarization
3
. Whereas between February and July 1990 
American and Soviet diplomacy endeavored to strike a difficult 
compromise about Germany’s international collocation, neither 
the United States nor the other members of the Atlantic Alliance 
ever undertook legally binding commitments not to invite new 
members; nonetheless, the negotiations held between February 
and July 1990 – more specifically the talks between U.S. Secretary 
of State James Baker III and Kohl with the Soviet leadership in 
Moscow in February 1990, Baker’s second visit to Moscow in 
May, the meetings between President George H.W. Bush and 
Michael Gorbachev in Washington and Camp David between the 
end of May and early June, and Kohl’s visit to Moscow and 
Stavropol in July 1990 – were ripe with mixed messages and 
diplomatic ambiguities. Soviet leaders were induced to believe 
that the alliance would not expand eastward, although they 
repeatedly failed to secure a written commitment from the United 
States, the West German government, and the other NATO 
members
4
. As the alliance embraced enlargement in the early 
1990s, the volatile nature of those agreements planted the seeds of 
mutual grievances, reinforcing conflicting perceptions of the 
events leading up to the demise of the East-West division and of 
the post-Cold War European order. Since then, Russian leaders 
have held the view that the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its 
380,000 troops from the GDR and allowed Germany to unify in 
return for a clear Western pledge that the alliance would not 
expand eastwards, while the West claims that the settlement of 
1989-1990 only addressed Germany’s role within the alliance and 
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did not extend to the countries of Eastern Europe and former 
Soviet republics or involve their formal commitment to remain 
outside of NATO. As Taubman and Savranskaya have pointed out, 
the tragic outcome of those negotiations was German unification 
within NATO and the deepening of a ‘common European home’ 
with no place for the Soviet Union or its successor
5
. 
The missed opportunities for reconciliation (1992-2002) 
As a result of the settlement that unified Germany and terminated 
the Cold War, during the 1990s efforts at revitalizing NATO and 
asserting its post-Cold War relevance were perceived in Russia, 
with a few exceptions, as endeavours that would perpetuate fault 
lines in Europe. Whereas in 1993 then Foreign Minister Andrei 
Kozyrev stated that Russia sees NATO members as natural friends 
and future allies and although NATO undertook a number of 
initiatives to assuage the Kremlin’s concerns, such as Moscow’s 
inclusion in the Partnership for Peace Program (PFP) in 1994, 
those endeavours failed to overcome Russian misgivings
6
. By 
contrast, Russian elites viewed with suspicion the alliance’s 
eastern enlargement and in the early 1990s attempted to preserve a 
degree of influence on the former Soviet space through the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Furthermore, 
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Moscow’s engagement with the alliance remained half-hearted, 
while Russian leaders displayed little interest, or indeed capacity 
in undertaking defense reforms in accordance with NATO norms, 
or in developing interoperability with alliance’s forces7. The 
European Union, undermined by its inability to provide a 
concerted response to the Bosnian war in the aftermath of the 
signing of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, could also do little to 
bridge the gap in mutual perceptions. In light of persisting 
uncertainty about the post-Soviet space’s collocation in the new 
European security order cooperation was established in a number 
of areas, while fundamental strategic differences remained 
unresolved. The outcome was that throughout the 1990s NATO-
Russia relations displayed a schizophrenic character: although 
Russian troops participated in the alliance’s peacekeeping 
involvement in Bosnia, the Kremlin feared that the main U.S. 
objective remained crippling Russia’s strategic potential and 
ensuring it could not recover quickly. As a result, Moscow 
questioned its partnership with the alliance – equating its 
association with the Western security community with a 
renunciation of its great power status – and attempted to promote 
OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) as 
an alternative to NATO’s premier role in Europe. Successive 
attempts to re-discuss the post-Cold War settlement, such as the 
1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations and the creation of the 
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), failed to resolve 
mutual differences, continuing to leave un-clarified the former 
Soviet space’s collocation within the post-Cold War European 
security architecture
8
. The eruption of the Kosovo crisis in 1999 
crudely exposed the limits of the settlement reached ten years 
earlier: the Kremlin opposed NATO’s military campaign against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and, although the Rambouillet 
agreement that the alliance negotiated with the Serbian leadership 
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allowed for the participation of Russian forces in the KFOR 
(Kosovo Force) mission, an escalation of the crisis was barely 
avoided when Russian troops suddenly gained control of Pristina 
airport in June 1999 ahead of the alliance
9
. While the airport 
standoff was emblematic of the schizophrenic character of NATO-
Russia relations – with Moscow cooperating with the alliance after 
supporting the Milosevic regime – the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001, shifting Western security concerns outside of the 
Euro-Atlantic area, temporarily strengthened NATO’s incentive to 
cooperate with Moscow and to give it an institutional character
10
. 
The Kremlin, too, had its own reasons for deepening relations with 
the alliance. Two costly counterinsurgency campaigns in 
Chechnya, continuing instability along its Caucasian and Central 
Asian borders, and Russia’s own experiences with Islamic 
terrorism – particularly the wave of attacks on major Russian 
cities that began in 2002 and culminated in the Beslan school 
hostage crisis in 2004 – reinforced Moscow’s interest in 
cooperation with NATO
11
. While continuing to antagonize the 
alliance, Russia displayed a readiness to cooperate in areas of 
mutual interest and sought legitimacy for counter-insurgency 
operations in the Caucasus: although remaining wary of NATO’s 
open door policy, the Kremlin allowed American forces to use 
Russian air space for operations in Afghanistan and tolerated the 
creation of U.S. bases in Central Asia. In May 2002, following 
President Vladimir Putin’s visit in November 2001 to Washington 
and Crawford, Russia was rewarded with formal association with 
the alliance through the signing of the Pratica di Mare agreements, 
which established the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). The NRC 
replaced the PJC, envisaging a mechanism for consultation, 
consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and action, where 
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NATO members and Russia would work as equal partners on a 
wide spectrum of security issues
12
. Counterterrorism was 
identified as a major terrain of cooperation, together with the 
development of joint initiatives, including crisis management, 
peacekeeping, air defense, joint exercises, and search-and-rescue 
operations
13
. The NRC organized unprecedented joint assessments 
of the terrorist threat and peacekeeping operations in the 
Balkans
14
; it allowed Russia to contribute to Operation “Active 
Endeavour” in the Mediterranean, while at the NATO Istanbul 
summit in 2004 the alliance and Moscow agreed on the 
development of a Joint Action Plan on Terrorism. The results of 
these engagements led, at one point, to then Russian Defense 
Minister Sergei Ivanov’s proposal to rename the NRC the “New 
Anti-Terrorist Organization”15. 
Nonetheless, while bridging mutual differences and 
institutionalizing a degree of cooperation, the NRC represented – 
after the agreement leading to the PJC – another missed 
opportunity towards a comprehensive resolution of those issues 
that had been left unresolved by the 1989-1990 settlement. 
Certainly, both sides had their own share of responsibilities for 
this failure. NATO was unwilling to make the concessions (such 
as Moscow’s deeper involvement in its decision-making process, 
together with an explicit assurance of no further enlargement) that 
would have been necessary to accommodate Russian grievances – 
dreading the prospect of empowering the Kremlin with veto power 
on the alliance’s decisions – and conceived the NRC as a token 
gift. Although the agreement had a large symbolic significance, 
the difference between the PJC and the NRC was more apparent 
than substantial; as emphasised by former NATO Secretary 
                                                     
12 “NATO-Russia relations: a new quality”, Declaration by Heads of State and 
Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation, available at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/ar/natohq/official_texts_19572.htm. 
13 “NATO Factsheet on Terrorism” is available at http://www.nato.int/terrorism/factsheet.htm. 
14 See the NATO-Russia Council Practical Cooperation Fact Sheet at http://www.nato.int/nrc-
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15 S. Ivanov, “Russia-NATO”, speech given at the International Institute for 
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General Lord Robertson, it had “more to do with chemistry than 
arithmetic”. Russia did not obtain a veto on NATO’s decisions; if 
NRC meetings failed to reach a consensus, the alliance could 
always return to the format of ‘19’16. For its part, the Kremlin did 
not resign itself to accepting junior partner status and continued to 
call publicly for the alliance’s transformation into a true Pan-
European institution that would overcome fault lines in Europe 
and welcome the Russian Federation as an equal member
17
. 
Moscow also displayed a deep-seated desire to base its NATO 
relationship on the principle of ‘equality’, ‘reciprocity’ and 
‘parity’, in which Russia’s status as a great power and influence 
over the post-Soviet space was acknowledged – a vision firmly 
embedded in President Putin’s 2005 statement to the Russian 
parliament that the collapse of the Soviet Union was one of the 
greatest tragedies of the 20
th
 century and in the ‘spheres of 
influences’ concept of Stalinist memory18. With NATO members 
lacking appetite for a revision of the post-Cold War settlement and 
unable to reach a consensus on relations with Moscow, domestic 
politics in Russia, centred on authoritarian modernization, and the 
Kremlin’s attempt to reinforce its authority and tighten its hold on 
society, did not facilitate closer interaction with the West
19
. As a 
result, NATO-Russia relations continued to be based on 
occasional and mainly ad hoc arrangements; while both sides had 
their own pragmatic motivations for expanding cooperation, the 
alliance’s members remained reluctant to entrust Moscow with 
decision-making prerogatives in areas of mutual interests, 
including the fight against terrorism. Without a vision to overcome 
long-standing diffidence and unwilling to consider marriage, the 
West offered Moscow cohabitation arrangements, that served 
useful functions without, however, providing satisfactory long-
term solutions, while Russia displayed little practical interest in 
                                                     
16 T. Forsberg, G. Herd (2015), pp. 47-48. 
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regular cooperation with NATO or in becoming a full member in 
the absence of a radical transformation of the alliance
20
.
 
Hence, the 
NRC did not fulfil its initial promise and never became the 
platform of discussion that was initially envisioned; rather, as 
Trenin argued, it was “turned into a mostly technical workshop – 
useful, but extremely narrow in scope”21. Cooperation between 
NATO and Russia remained based largely on the personal 
connection between George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin – 
displaying a responsive and pragmatic rather than a purposeful and 
normative character – while the NRC failed to resolve the 
underlying tensions of the post-Cold War settlement. 
The return of tensions 
and the failure of the ‘reset’ (2002-2012) 
With the NRC failing to settle unresolved issues and to dissipate 
reciprocal diffidence, un-defused tension between the alliance and 
Moscow erupted in the early 2000s following Washington’s 
withdrawal from the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in 2002, 
NATO’s invitation at its Prague summit to seven new members, 
including former Soviet republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Estonia,
 
and open support for the Rose, Orange and Tulip 
Revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, in 2003, 2004, 
and 2005 respectively
22
. While offering use of its territory for 
shipments of supplies to NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan 
through the northern distribution network, Moscow responded to a 
perceived Western encirclement by supporting Russian minorities 
abroad and exerting economic and political pressure on nearby 
                                                     
20 J.A. Baker III, “Russia in NATO?”, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2002, p. 95. 
21 D. Trenin, “NATO and Russia: Partnership or Peril?”, Current History, vol. 108, 
no. 720, October 2009, p. 300. 
22 A. Kelin, “Attitude to NATO Expansion: Calmly Negative”, International Affairs, 
Moscow, vol. 50, no. 1, 2004, pp. 17-25; C. Fairbanks, “Georgia’s Rose Revolution”, 
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republics with pro-Western aspirations
23
.
 
The Kremlin also cast 
itself as the protective centre for the entire Russian-speaking 
cultural community, endeavouring to regain a position of strength 
in the former Soviet region from which it could forcibly 
renegotiate the post-Cold War international settlement. Following 
NATO’s second round of enlargement, which for the first time led 
to the inclusion in the alliance of former Soviet republics, Moscow 
expected specific assurances and requested that the Baltic States 
join the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty; a demand 
that was rebuffed by the alliance which linked their accession to 
the withdrawal of remaining Russian forces from Georgia and 
from the Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria
24
. Western 
support for the ‘color revolutions’ and U.S. missile defense plans 
were the cause of further Russian anxiety and accelerated a 
progressive deterioration in relations between the alliance and 
Moscow. Denouncing Western policy as a menace for Russian 
national security, in 2007 the Kremlin first declared that the 1987 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty no longer served 
Moscow’s interests; it then suspended the application of the CFE 
treaty as a reaction to the non-accession of the Baltic States
25
. At 
the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008 consideration of the 
preparatory Membership Action Plan (MAP) programme – a 
roadmap towards NATO membership – for Georgia and Ukraine 
met with firm resistance from Russia. Tension exploded
 
in August 
2008 when then Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili’s attempt 
to regain full control of South Ossetia provided Moscow with a 
pretext for drawing a line in the sand through military action. The 
Kremlin distilled its own Putin doctrine, claiming a right to 
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intervene militarily in former Soviet republics to settle, with 
military force if necessary, territorial and ethnic disputes, keep oil 
and gas pipelines running, and continue “the civilizing role of 
Russia on the Eurasian continent”26. The war against Georgia 
exposed the NRC’s limits; the alliance reacted by establishing a 
NATO-Georgia Commission, de facto suspending the NRC, 
endorsing the signing of a bilateral U.S.-Polish missile agreement, 
relocating a U.S. Patriot missile battery from Germany to Poland, 
and starting defense planning for the Baltic States. Nonetheless, 
with the United States bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq and 
with France and Germany lacking any appetite for a military 
confrontation, the West proved incapable of deterring Russian 
action or of effective intervention. While making a firm point that 
further eastern encroachment by NATO and the EU would be 
resisted, Moscow complained that its request to discuss Georgian 
‘aggression’ at the NRC had been obstructed by the alliance, 
undermining the Council’s very purpose27. In the same year, the 
Kremlin announced an ‘active response’ to the Bush 
administration’s revival of missile defense, warning that Russia 
might target European components of the planned shield and 
deploy nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad
28
. Faced with the worst 
deterioration in relations since the Cold War, after taking office in 
January 2009 the Obama administration promised a ‘reset’ in 
relations, resuming diplomatic contacts and limited cooperation 
with Moscow. In early 2009 Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei 
Lavrov, agreed with President Obama and then Secretary of State, 
Hillary Clinton, to work together on a number of issues, such as 
terrorism, nuclear proliferation and Afghanistan; informal 
meetings of the NRC were also resumed. The most notable 
achievements of the Democratic administration’s attempt to 
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engage Moscow were a revitalization of the NRC, then Russian 
President Vladimir Medvedev’s attendance at the alliance’s 2010 
Lisbon summit, and the inclusion in NATO’s new Strategic 
Concept of a section on relations with Russia
29
. Nonetheless, even 
the ‘reset’ turned out to be an inadequate remedy that could not 
revive an institution that had been decisively undermined by the 
conflicting strategic priorities of its most powerful members; as 
such, it represented another missed opportunity for a clarification 
of the former Soviet space’s collocation in the post-Cold War 
European order. While bringing about a number of results in low-
profile areas, such as Russia’s ratification of the Status of Forces 
Agreement, which paved the way for joint military exercises on 
Russian territory, and the inauguration of the Cooperative 
Airspace Initiative, which brought together Russia and NATO to 
pool air traffic data to combat air-based terrorism, the ‘reset’ failed 
to assuage the Kremlin’s grievances that the current architecture 
marginalizes Russia and produces a bifurcation of security on the 
continent.
 
Whereas Washington confirmed its determination to 
pursue missile defense, criticized Russian plans to establish 
permanent military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and 
condemned measures taken by the Kremlin to quell domestic 
opposition, Moscow continued to campaign for the establishment 
of an ‘all inclusive’ Pan-European security – from Vancouver to 
Vladivostok or Helsinki Plus – architecture, to prevent any further 
alliance enlargement, and to seek the West’s implicit acceptance 
of the post-Soviet space as an area of ‘privileged interests’, as 
proven by Medvedev’s 2008 proposal for a new Pan-European 
security treaty that would limit troop deployments in Eastern 
Europe, and by successive requests for the establishment of a 
formal dialogue between NATO and the Russian-engineered 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
30
.
 
While the 
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alliance stopped short of making Russia a full partner, in the 
absence of a comprehensive re-discussion of the 1989-1990 
settlement hopes that the ‘reset’ could resolve persisting tension 
and overcome reciprocal diffidence rapidly proved misplaced. 
The 2013 crisis and its consequences: which way 
forward? 
While the ‘reset’ proved an inadequate remedy to reverse 
confrontational dynamics, the Euromaidan protest dramatically 
worsened relations between the alliance and Moscow. As in the 
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early 2000s, when the ‘color revolutions’ sparked deeply 
conflicting reactions, events in Ukraine were viewed in the West 
and Russia in almost opposite images. Although in his inaugural 
speech new NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted that 
NATO does not seek confrontation with Moscow
31
; the Kremlin 
perceived Western support for the Euromaidan demonstrators as a 
threat to its endeavors to regain a grip on former Soviet republics 
through Eurasian integration projects, while the alliance viewed it 
as an opportunity to hammer a further nail in the coffin of Russian 
hegemonic ambitions over the post-Soviet space. Whereas 
Moscow accused the West of masterminding the Euromaidan 
‘coup d’état’ – as the Kremlin termed it –, it rapidly secured 
control of the Crimean peninsula, where the Russian Black Sea 
Fleet was based, on the grounds of protecting Crimea’s largely 
Russian population – a move that for many Russians was simply 
the rectification of a Soviet-era internal border and one that carried 
the overwhelming endorsement of the people of the peninsula
32
. 
The Kremlin also provided vital support to the separatist revolts in 
the Donbass region, asserting Russia’s historical ties to the area 
and referring to Eastern Ukrainian districts north of the Black Sea, 
including the towns of Donetsk, Luhansk, Odessa and 
Dnipropetrovsk, as ‘Novorossiya’ or ‘New Russia’33. As an 
immediate reaction to the ‘Russian aggression’, in April 2014 
NATO decided to suspend all practical civilian and military 
cooperation with Moscow, although the dialogue in the NRC 
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continued at the ambassadorial level. Furthermore, while in 
December 2014 the Ukrainian parliament dropped the country’s 
non-aligned status and renewed its bid for NATO membership, in 
February 2015 the alliance announced the creation of a ‘spearhead 
force’ to provide a rapid response to emerging crises in the eastern 
or southern countries of the alliance
34. Following Moscow’s 2013 
deployment of Iskander missiles to the Western military district, 
including the Kaliningrad oblast, Russia’s westernmost point, the 
alliance also deepened cooperation with the Scandinavian 
countries: at its Newport Wales summit in September 2014 
Finland – whose neutrality is vital for Russian maritime traffic to 
and from Kaliningrad – and Sweden signed ‘Host Nation’ 
agreements with NATO to establish policy and procedures for 
operational and logistic support sites
35. Moscow’s response was a 
new military doctrine approved in December 2014, which 
brandishes NATO’s buildup near its border as a chief threat to 
Russian security, and its withdrawal in the following March from 
the Joint Consultative Group on the Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) – the only consultative forum that 
Russia continued to attend – on the grounds that the agreement 
had become pointless from political and practical viewpoints
36
. 
After the ‘color revolutions’ in the early 2000s, the Russian-
Georgian war of 2008, and the dispute over missile defense, the 
Ukrainian crisis has therefore become the latest indication that, if 
the uncertainty over the former Soviet space’s collocation in the 
European security architecture is not resolved, there is a 
considerable risk that Russia and the West might continue to drift 
apart. Although cooperation at the practical level continues in a 
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number of issue areas and the Kremlin maintains its diplomatic 
mission to NATO, it might become difficult to restore any 
meaningful interaction without a comprehensive re-discussion of 
the roots of current grievances, leaving a number of former Soviet 
regions in an apparently ‘frozen’ but potentially explosive 
scenario. Are there any remedies or is a descent into a new Cold 
War a foregone conclusion? The question may indeed be a false 
one: NATO-Russia tensions, rather than the outcome of 
insurmountable divergences, are the consequence of conflicting 
strategic priorities that were inherited by current elites from the 
agreements that more than two decades ago brought the Cold War 
to an end
37
. While it is difficult to see how relations between 
Russia and the alliance might break this confrontational cycle 
without a comprehensive revision of that settlement, in the present 
circumstances it is unlikely that Moscow would seriously risk 
armed conflict with NATO over the fate, for example, of the 
Baltic States or of Eastern Ukraine
38
. Although significantly 
revitalized by the reform of 2008 and with no regional power 
capable of matching their might, the Russian armed forces 
continue to be plagued by serious organizational, logistical, and 
technical deficiencies and might be hard put to stand up to a full 
alliance engagement. Furthermore, the broader geopolitical and 
economic prospects for Russia remain uncertain. The Russian 
economy continues to rely heavily on the energy sector, which is 
responsible for two-thirds of export earnings and half of all tax 
revenue; in the current climate of depressed oil prices, Russia 
seems increasingly vulnerable. Despite the Kremlin’s rhetoric, at 
the beginning of 2015 the Russian economy appeared to be in 
free-fall, battered by the impact of Western sanctions, with the 
value of the ruble collapsing, rocketing interest rates, and 
worrying falls in energy revenues
39
. As President Putin remarked 
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in April 2015, despite persisting strategic differences, Russia 
continues to share with the West a number of fundamental 
interests, ranging from the non-proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction to fighting organized crime and terrorism, and tackling 
poverty
40
. Whereas the descent into a new Cold War could prove 
particularly costly for Moscow, the West could gain by 
acknowledging that there might be some substance to Russian 
grievances
41; while Ukraine’s association agreement with the EU 
was one of the triggers of the current crisis, Germany, in light of 
its role in the inception of the post-Cold War settlement and its 
influence within the bloc of 28, has gradually taken centre stage, 
making it clear that it will not ship arms to Kiev
42. Berlin’s 
problem, however, is that it does not appear to have a 
comprehensive solution to bring the crisis to an end, while the 
structure of the EU’s common security and defense policy is no 
help
43
. Having deep-seated interests in ending the conflict, 
preserving Ukraine’s territorial integrity and restoring meaningful 
cooperation with Moscow, Germany and other members of the 
European Union should lobby with the United States and their 
Eastern European partners to adopt a policy that recognizes 
Russia’s security interests and minority rights, while upholding 
the territorial integrity of Ukraine and other former Soviet 
republics. As negotiations with Iran have recently proved, good 
relations with Russia are essential for the West to deal with a 
number of pressing issues, including the conflicts in Syria, Iraq 
and Afghanistan, an increasing terrorist threat, and eventually with 
the rise of China’s political and military prowess. While in the 
current scenario the assumption of any significant role by the EU – 
for example through a joint EU-Russian crisis management 
operation in Eastern Ukraine with the participation of OSCE 
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observers – remains a remote prospect, a renewed NATO 
engagement with the Kremlin in the spirit of the 1967 Harmel 
Report, providing a balanced mix of deterrence and strategic 
reassurances for Moscow, might offer a first breakthrough
44
. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the crisis between the alliance and 
Russia that was triggered by the Euromaidan revolt marks the 
latest episode of a progressive deterioration in relations, whose 
origin can be found in the volatile nature of the East-West 
settlement which brought the Cold War to an end. With the 
agreements of 1989-1990 failing to clarify the former Soviet 
space’s collocation in the new European security architecture, 
NATO has incorporated the Baltic States and maintained an open 
door policy towards Georgia and Ukraine, while Moscow has 
sought a coordinated revision of the current Pan-European order, 
endeavoring to win the West’s recognition of Russia’s sphere of 
special interests and to establish a new security belt along its 
frontiers. Since the inviolability of national borders is a 
fundamental pillar of a Europe that is ‘whole and free’, the West 
should rediscover the mantra of the 1967 Harmel Report, 
remaining vigilant about Russian moves but also endeavoring to 
engage the Kremlin in talks about a clarification of the former 
Soviet space’s collocation within the current European security 
structure. While, as Polish President, Bronislaw Komorowski, 
remarked in a speech to the Ukrainian Rada in April, there might 
not be a stable Europe without a free Ukraine
45
; there will 
certainly not be a secure continent without a comprehensive 
reconciliation with Russia. 
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4.  Russia, Poland and the “New Europe”: 
Inevitable Clash? 
 Stefan Bielański  
The Russia-Poland relationship has never been ordinary. Rivalry 
and mistrust have been generally predominant. This attitude did 
not change during the Cold War, when Poland was integrated into 
the so-called ‘Soviet Bloc’. Quite the contrary, this historical 
experience fuelled new suspicions, adding ideological divergences 
to traditional Moscow-Warsaw geopolitical competition. From 
this standpoint the Russia-Poland relationship presents undeniable 
specificities, clearly different from relations with the other 
regional countries. Therefore the very concept of “New Europe”, 
elaborated after 1989, could be misleading, unfit to embrace the 
wider set of different geopolitical interests and attitudes towards 
Russia in the region. The Baltic States, with a large Russian-
speaking population, and Poland have traditionally had strong 
anti-Russian sentiments, fearing the revival of Russia’s 
imperialistic ambitions. At the same time, statements by 
Hungarian and Czech Republic leaders show that their foreign 
policy vector is changing toward closer relations with Russia, 
mainly motivated by their energy security issues and the economic 
concessions that Russia is ready to offer in exchange for their 
formal loyalty.  
With a view to analysing the dynamics of these relations, and 
better understanding the origins of major unresolved issues 
between Russia and Eastern Europe, it is key to start from a 
historical prospective, thus highlighting the roots to the current 
situation. 
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At the roots of the confrontation 
The Central and Eastern Europe 1945 post-war borders were 
progressively demarcated by leaders of the anti-German alliance 
during the conferences in Teheran (1943), Yalta and Potsdam 
(1945). Despite the fact that Poland formally belonged to the 
victorious countries of World War II, its eastern border was also 
changed in accordance with the so-called Curzon line or along the 
river Bug. Thus the eastern territories, with the city of Wilno (in 
Lithuanian Vilnius) and Lwów (in Ukraine called Lviv) were 
excluded from Polish borders. 
Therefore, after 1945 post-war Poland was faced with the 
challenges of rebuilding the country in a situation of border 
changes, massive material and population losses, and radical 
political and geopolitical changes. Moreover, international politics 
strongly affected Poland’s internal dimension, as clearly testified 
to by its participation in the Warsaw Pact’s invasion of 
Czechoslovakia (1968). Therefore during the 1950s and 1960s 
Polish foreign policy was characterized by its ideological, political 
and military dependency on the Soviet Union. At the same time, 
the issue of its western borders largely regulated through the 
Federal Republic of Germany’s recognition (in 1970) of the Oder-
Neisse line had important impact as well. 
The international situation changed substantially in the late 
1970s and 1980s with the election of Pope Cardinal Karol Wojtyła 
(John Paul II), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) and the 
rise of the “Solidarność” movement (1980). Despite attempts to 
maintain the Communist system (including a military coup by 
Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski in Poland on 13 December 1981, but 
also attempts to reform the system under the “perestroika” of 
Gorbachev), the 1980s brought about the fall of communist 
ideology and the collapse of the Soviet power system. In Poland 
on 4 June 1989 the first free (though not fully democratic) 
parliamentary elections in post-war Poland were held, bringing 
victory to “Solidarność”, and marking the symbolic end of 
Moscow’s domination of Poland. 
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The changes in Central and Eastern Europe that had began in 
Poland in 1989 led to the dissolution of the Soviet bloc and 
became one of the causes of the USSR’s dissolution in 1991. 
Russia was turned into the Russian Federation and a number of 
newly independent states (Baltic States, Ukraine, Belarus) became 
Poland’s neighbours. The Russian Federation shares a border (on 
the northeast) with Poland: it is the so-called enclave of 
Kaliningrad. Since 2004, the eastern border of Poland has also 
become an important part of the new eastern borders of the 
European Union. 
It is interesting to note that the first country to recognize the 
independence of Ukraine was Poland (in 1991). The Polish policy 
of reconciling Ukraine with Europe and the Euro-Atlantic alliance 
(in the 1990s we also had hopes of including Belarus, already 
ruled by Aleksandr Lukashenko, into this process) was no doubt 
influenced by the concepts of a Polish emigré magazine called 
Kultura, published in Paris and directed by Jerzy Giedroyc, but 
also by the ideas of Professor Zbigniew Brzeziński, sovietologist 
and an American of Polish descent. According to these 
conceptions an independent Ukraine was to ensure the 
independence of Poland. 
In the 1990s and the early years of the XXI century, Poland 
established a policy of supporting the sovereignty of countries 
detaching from the USSR, including Ukraine (the Orange 
Revolution) and Georgia (the period of Mikhail Saakashvili’s 
presidency). Moscow has always opposed Polish policies of 
supporting the independence and development of democracy in 
countries like Ukraine or Georgia and for this reason from the 
early 1990s until today the relations between Poland and Russia 
have been tense and conflicting (except for short periods of thaw 
tests). 
The government of Donald Tusk – who was Prime Minister of 
Poland in the period 2007-2014 – from 2010 to 2013 tried to adopt 
the policy of ‘thaw’ or ‘reset’ in relations with Russia (being, 
however, strongly opposed by President Lech Kaczyński and the 
leader of the main opposition party, the president’s brother, 
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Jarosław Kaczyński). It should be recalled that President Lech 
Kaczyński (tragically died in the Smolensk air disaster on Russian 
territory in April 2010) became famous for delivering “a 
geopolitical prophecy” during a meeting in Tbilisi in 2008 in the 
course of the Russian-Georgian war. Regarding the aggressive 
policy of Putin’s Russia, he argued that Georgia was its first 
victim, but that later on Russian tanks could appear – in order of 
succession – in Ukraine, the Baltic States and finally in Poland. 
From Warsaw to Moscow: today’s confrontation 
Besides the aversion Polish politicians had towards the ‘thaw’ in 
relations with Russia, there have been and still remain objective 
geopolitical reasons for conflict between Poland and Russia. These 
reasons particularly include the historical complexities linking 
Poland, Ukraine and Russia, but also the issue of energy security, 
and finally the role of Poland in its preparation for and active 
membership in the EU and NATO. This list has recently been 
increased by the support Poland gave Ukraine during the “Maidan 
Revolution”, as well as after the fall of Viktor Yanukovych’s 
regime. Additionally, Poland provided Ukrainians with political 
support in the context of the Russian occupation of Crimea and the 
military conflict with the so-called ‘pro-Russian rebels’ in the 
southeast of Ukraine. 
It should be emphasized that the “Maidan Revolution” (2013-
14) caused a fairly radical change in the attitudes of the Polish 
government, including Prime Minister Donald Tusk and his 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radosław Sikorski, towards Putin’s 
Russia. Mutual accusations and the use of language typical of the 
Cold War were heard in both Moscow and Warsaw. 
The decision made at the 2014 summit in Brussels to appoint 
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk to the position of President of 
the European Council is important and seemed to signal the EU’s 
firm stand against Moscow. It should also be remembered that 
during that same meeting of EU Heads of State and Government a 
line of ‘geopolitical balance’ was confirmed, urging the two 
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shores of the European continent (the Baltic Sea and the 
Mediterranean) to complement each other instead of compete. 
Poland as a member of the EU and of NATO clearly gave its 
support to the new Ukrainian leadership (President Petro 
Poroshenko and Prime Minister Arsenij Yatsenyuk) that emerged 
after the “Maidan Revolution”. The Polish government did not 
accept the annexation of Crimea and even the Polish press and 
television, reporting on the ongoing war in Ukraine, denounced – 
especially during the summer of 2014 – the Russian military 
presence in the southeast of the Ukrainian state and its support for 
the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk Republics during the 
war that was supposed to be concluded with a cease-fire agreed 
upon in Minsk through the mediation of the President of Belarus, 
Aleksandr Lukashenko. In particular, during the negotiations 
started in Minsk the so-called ‘Normandy Format’ was used. In 
fact, the celebration of the 70
th
 anniversary of the Allied landing in 
Normandy in 1944 offered the chance to involve France, 
Germany, Russia and Ukraine in the discussion of possible 
solutions to the crisis.  
At this point it is necessary to examine the objectives of 
Russian policy that had become bitterly anti-Western by the at the 
end of 2013 and even more so in 2014, Evidences of this dynamic 
relate to the so-called Eurasian Union, a project that is strongly 
supported by the Putin entourage. With this union Russia would 
not be a simple regional power but a world superpower, as in the 
days of the USSR. It should be added that from the viewpoint of 
Putin’s ideological line such an outlook is very close to the 
nationalist view, and symbolized by the Kremlin’s alliance with 
the Orthodox Church – seemingly a geopolitical attempt at 
reconstruction of “Greater Russia” in such a way that one might 
sense the inheritance of both Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. 
The new policy and military actions of President Putin’s Russia 
were put into practice in 2014 in Crimea. Through clever military 
operations (with Russian special forces that acted in full 
anonymity), politics (a referendum with 95 per cent in favour of 
reunification with ‘motherland Russia’) and finally propaganda 
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(with Russian television being in the ‘front line’) Putin’s Russia 
made the annexation – in March 2014 – of Crimea and the city of 
Sevastopol, thereby consolidating its geostrategic position on the 
Black Sea. 
It should be borne in mind that the ultimate goal of Putin’s 
policy is a radical change in the current territorial system of 
Central and Eastern Europe, with the intention of regaining direct 
or indirect influence over some former Soviet territories. Putin 
himself has repeatedly said that the dissolution of the USSR (by 
which he also means the fall of Russian domination) was “the 
largest geopolitical catastrophe” of the XX century. Putin’s wars, 
from Georgia to Ukraine, have a territorial and geopolitical 
character. The Russian annexation of Crimea and de facto 
domination over the Donbas region means – in particular 
regarding Crimea – a serious violation of international law and a 
dangerous precedent for possible territorial changes in Europe. 
Nevertheless it is important to point out that some Eastern and 
Central European countries show attitudes that differ from that of 
Warsaw. Hungary’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, has recently 
met Vladimir Putin signing an important energy agreement. The 
Czech Republic’s President, Miloš Zeman, in his interview with a 
Russian radio station said that his dream is to see Russia as a 
member of the European Union. Nevertheless, these positions do 
not derive from a pro-Russian policy, but are motivated by the 
political, economic and military opportunities that such 
cooperation can provide.  
No room for historical reconciliation? 
The current Russian ‘historical narrative’ on Polish-Russian 
relations and the assessment of Polish politics is clearly negative. 
However, it should be noted that in the first decade of the twenty-
first century attempts to understand the complexity of these 
relationships were made – a noble effort, considering it took place 
under the most difficult circumstances in the entire history of 
Polish-Russian relations throughout the twentieth century. As a 
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result of research conducted both by Polish and Russian historians, 
a work (of nearly 900 pages) was published in 2010, edited 
through Adam D. Rotfeld and Anatoly W. Torkunov’s joint effort 
and titled White stains - black stains. Difficult issues in Polish-
Russian relations, 1918-2008 (Polish Institute of International 
Affairs, Warsaw, 2010)
1
. 
Only five years ago, in 2010, it seemed that there was a 
possibility of agreement between Poland and Russia even on the 
most sensitive issues, symbolized for decades by the Soviet denial, 
maintained also in the new Russia, of one of the cruellest crimes 
of Stalinism – the massacre of prisoners of war, Polish officers, 
which took place in 1940 in Katyń. But despite the fact that 
Russian leaders have accepted the true course of events of the 
1940s – which was in itself an important breakthrough – a shadow 
was cast over the celebrations at Katyń in 2010 by the plane crash 
over Smolensk, in which the then Polish president, Lech 
Kaczyński, and 95 representatives of the Polish political elite 
perished. And so at the beginning of the second decade of the XXI 
century, in the specific context of the Ukrainian crisis initiated by 
the pro-European “Maidan Revolution” in 2013, Russia officially 
and in a decisive manner denied any attempts to open – in terms of 
historical policy – to Polish postulates, returning to the traditional 
interpretation of Polish-Russian relations that marked Soviet 
times. Jan Rydel points to Polish attempts to maintain dialog with 
regard to a jointly acknowledged historical policy, stressing that 
the so-called reset in Polish-Russian relations was also to include 
historical policy. The Polish scholar recalls that in 2009 a 
successful Polish-Russian-German conference on the Ribbentrop-
Molotov pact was held. During the same year Vladimir Putin was 
the guest of honour at the Polish celebrations of the 70
th
 
anniversary of outbreak of World War II, and in 2011 the Polish 
Parliament decided to create a Center for Polish-Russian Dialog 
and Understanding. Finally – trying to repeat the formula of 
                                                     
1 A.D. Rotfeld, A.W. Torkunow (eds.), Białe plamy – czarne plamy. Sprawy trudne w 
polsko-rosyjskich stosunkach 1918-2008, Warszawa, Polski Instytut Spraw 
Międzynarodowych, 2010. 
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“forgive and ask for forgiveness” – the chairman of the Polish 
Episcopal Conference, Archbishop Józef Michalik, and Patriarch 
Kirill of Moscow in 2012 signed a joint Message to the Polish and 
Russian nations. Despite these attempts at reconciliation – 
especially with respect to a common, difficult history – current 
political events, situating Poland and Russia on opposite sides of 
geopolitical disputes, led de facto to the cancellation of all joint 
activities of this kind. Moreover, according to Rydel: “the 
objective was not achieved, as the aforesaid religious act was 
prepared according to an explicitly political order, and the 
‘Message’ was signed in circumstances more fit for an 
international agreement than an act of goodwill and reflex 
conscience”2.   
A sign of collapse of the joint historical policy based on the 
principle of Polish-Russian reconciliation and forgiveness was, 
among others, the return of Russia to the traditional – i.e. Soviet or 
even Stalinist – geopolitical interpretation of the origins and 
consequences of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 23 August 1939, 
which resulted in a Soviet alliance with the Third Reich (1939-
1941), and for the Poles meant the invasion of the Red Army on 
17 September 1939 and a ‘fourth partition’ of Polish territories, 
leaving the Polish East under Soviet control. While Western 
Europe, but also Poland, does not negate the USSR’s contribution 
to the victory over the Third Reich, the interpretation of the 
origins of the world conflict, especially the issue of the current 
Russian view of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, encounters debate 
and sometimes firm opposition. In March 2015 Polish historians 
decisively criticized the wording of a joint German-Russian 
history textbook about the XXI century, which upheld the former 
Soviet thesis on the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact stating that in 1939 
Stalin “had no choice and was forced to enter into a pact with 
Hitler”. A critical opinion of the Russian stance on this was 
expressed on the Polish side by Łukasz Kamiński, President of the 
                                                     
2 J. Rydel, Polish historical policy towards Central and Eastern Europe, International 
Scientific Conference “Italy, Poland and a new Eastern Europe”, Pedagogical 
University in Kraków, 2015.  
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Institute of National Remembrance, stating for the portal Interia.pl 
that: “attempts at falsifying facts of this kind are very worrying”3. 
In this context it seems important to cite Timothy Snyder, who 
argued that Russia’s ‘historical policy’ is directly linked to its 
foreign policy, aimed at destabilization of the international order
4
. 
Energy security issue in bilateral relations 
A general evaluation of Polish-Soviet economic relations is not 
easy, all the more so that it cannot be detached from ideological or 
geopolitical disputes. There is no doubt that a number of economic 
links – especially in the energy sector – have survived the collapse 
of the Soviet system and still affect, often negatively, 
contemporary economic relations between Poland and Russia.  
For contemporary Poland an issue of considerable economic, 
but also geostrategic and geopolitical, importance is energy 
security. It is widely viewed as being both internal – aimed at 
diversifying the sourcing of energy and power development as a 
strategic sector of the economy, but also external – aimed at 
attracting economic partners in mining and the transport and 
distribution of energy resources. 
Energy security is one of the major issues in the relations 
between Russia and Eastern Europe. The Eastern European 
countries have traditionally been more dependent on Russian oil 
and gas than their Western neighbours. The Baltic States import 
their entire gas supply from Russia. Russian gas amounts to 99 per 
cent of the Czech Republic’s imports and to 89 per cent of 
                                                     
3 Historycy oburzeni niemiecko-rosyjskim podręcznikiem do historii [Historical overview on 
German-Russian History Books], www.interia.pl, 15 March 2005, and A. Kazimierczuk, 
“Niemiecko-rosyjski podręcznik historii: spór o pakt Ribbentrop-Mołotow” 
[German-Russia history book: Discussion on Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact], 
Rzeczpospolita, 11 March 2015. 
4 T. Snyder in the Conference organized by the EEP Group in the European 
Parliament, “War and Peace 1945-2015”, 6 May 2015. Russia’s position has been 
reconfirmed by president Putin during his press-conference after the meeting with 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel on 10 May 2015.  
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Hungarian consumption. Last year Poland imported as much as 60 
per cent of its gas consumption from Russia, while it is starting to 
become much better at looking after its energy needs.  
All the pipelines built by the Soviet Union to supply gas to its 
satellites were designed to operate in one direction only, from 
Russia westward. Promoted by Donald Tusk, the European Energy 
Union fostered some important initiatives with the aim to achieve 
energy independence, such as regasification projects. And so since 
1
st
 April, Poland is able to import significantly more gas from 
Germany, thanks to the expansion of a pumping station at 
Mallnow on the border. The gas in the Yamal pipeline, which 
brings Russian gas to Germany (via Belarus and Poland), can, for 
the first time, be pumped from west to east. Moreover, a liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) terminal is under construction at the moment. 
This will start importing gas on tankers from Qatar next year. 
Accordingly, Poland can meet its own gas needs entirely thanks to 
these initiatives. Nevertheless, importing gas from Russia is still 
cheaper than the existing alternatives and Poland is still bound by 
a long-term gas supply from Russia that expires only in 2022. 
Source: Radio Free Europe 
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As a consequence, among the most important factors shaping 
Polish energy security policy are its relations with Russia. It is 
through this perspective that we must analyse the importance of 
Moscow’s so-called energy policy, especially with regard to 
possible, but politically conditioned, supplies of natural gas to 
Europe. An illustrative example of this policy was the construction 
– in particular with the aid of German financing – of the so-called 
“North European Gas Pipeline”, located at the bottom of the Baltic 
Sea, bypassing Poland and other transit countries. The strategic 
objectives of the Russian Federation are as follows: a) Russia’s 
acquisition of decisive or full control of energy supplies to the 
European Union; b) the acquisition of partial or full control over 
energy distributors in EU countries; c) partial dependence of the 
EU on the Russian energy sector. In contrast, Poland’s goals are 
diametrically opposed, namely: building its own transport systems 
for oil, natural gas and electricity and its own energy 
infrastructure. An important element of the so-called 
diversification plan would be the search for new energy sources 
(particularly in the area of renewable energy, or exploration and 
then exploitation of shale gas). Despite many official declarations, 
Poland still has a huge problem with energy independence
5
, and it 
comes as no surprise that it is trying hard to initiate a common 
European energy policy. At the same time Jakub M. Godzimirski, 
expert of The Polish Institute of International Affairs, points to the 
current geopolitical context and states:   
Russian actions in Ukraine have […] challenged the very basic 
norms promoted by the EU, and have gravely undermined the 
existing international order. Russia has breached international 
law and invaded a neighbouring country to punish it for its pro-
Western choice. Russia’s violation of international norms in 
Ukraine has had consequences for the EU’s thinking about 
energy cooperation with Russia. The Russian-Ukrainian crisis 
has also made the EU more aware of the risks to which its 
                                                     
5 In March 2014, exactly when Russia was annexing Crimea, Poland was importing 
70 per cent gas and 93 per cent oil from Russia. Cfr. A. Kublik, “Europa i Polska 
mocno uzależnione od gazu i ropy z Rosji” [Europe and Poland’s heavy dependence 
on Russian oil and gas], Gazeta Wyborcza, 24 March 2014. 
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energy security is exposed, partly due to the lack of 
diversification of suppliers and supply routes, and even more so 
because of its increasing dependence on imports from Russia. 
However, more action is needed to translate those new ideas into 
an efficient energy policy towards Russia, which is re-emerging 
as a power in Europe
6
. 
Conclusion 
Trying to answer the title question: that is, whether long-term, 
peaceful cooperation between Poland and Russia is possible, or 
whether these countries are doomed to ‘eternal conflict’, we 
should consider the following factors:  
1. The importance of geopolitics in contemporary Russia and 
Poland. 
2. Complicated geopolitical relations between the Poles, 
Ukrainians and Russians. 
3. The international context with special emphasis on the role 
of the European Union, NATO and Russian projects for a 
Eurasian Union. 
Even a brief overview of Polish-Russian relations, referring to 
both the past and the present, shows their complexity and 
ambiguity. These relationships also seem to be burdened with an 
element of unpredictability, and perhaps even some fatalism. It is 
characteristic for short periods of ‘reconciliation’ or ‘thaw’ to be 
followed by much longer periods of non-cooperation, resentment, 
hatred, and armed conflicts. Undoubtedly, the most important 
factors negatively defining contemporary Polish-Russian relations 
should be attributed to geopolitics. Therefore, assessing 
contemporary geopolitical concepts, the Polish researcher Leszek 
Moczulski points to the importance of the Eurasian trend in 
current Kremlin policy, noting that: “The breakdown of the Soviet 
Union pushed Russia back to its former geopolitical location. A 
                                                     
6 J.M. Godzimirski, European Energy Security in the Wake of the Russian-Ukraine Crisis, 
PISM, Strategic File, vol. 63, no. 27, December 2014, p. 5. 
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sentiment towards lost imperialism favours attitudes directed 
against the West and its civilization”. In this context he recalls the 
concepts of Dugin and Zhirinovsky; however, as Moczulski 
continues: 
It would be wrong to assume that only extreme factions adopt 
these views. Such geopolitical thinking is becoming as common 
in Russia as was the concept of ‘natural borders’ in France a 
hundred years ago. Serious politicians postulate building a 
lasting stability in Europe based on two integration processes: 
the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian [...]. The geopolitical imperative 
for Russia should be achieving control over the entire Asian 
continent
7
. 
Moczulski emphasizes the importance of the so-called ‘Russian 
Idea’, which is in his opinion a “synthesis of various Russian 
doctrines:  autocracy, a state Orthodox church, slavophilism, 
panslavism, eurasianism and Marxism-Leninism. It is a doctrine 
openly opposed to occidentalism, which comprises a pro-Western 
doctrine, calling for the Europeanization of the country”8. Russian 
geopolitical convictions undoubtedly legitimize the expansionist 
policies of the Kremlin, implemented through methods ranging 
from influencing local elites up to the use of armed force as in 
Georgia or Ukraine. On these grounds a dispute with Poland, 
trying to realize its objective of ‘Ostpolitik’ (but along Euro-
Atlantic lines) seems inevitable – especially after it became a 
member of NATO (1999) and the EU (2004). Thus, for Poland 
“one of the key problems connected with the subject of further 
extension of the Euro-Atlantic structures to the East is the overall 
relations between Russia and the United States and the European 
Union, with special consideration for the ex-satellite countries of 
the Soviet Union”9. In this context, Poland’s active stand on the 
                                                     
7 L. Moczulski, Geopolityka. Potęga w czasie i przestrzeni [Geopolitics. The power 
of time and space], Warszawa, Dom Wydawniczy Bellona, 1999, pp. 511-512. 
8 Ibid., pp. 514-515. 
9 S. Bielański, “Poland in NATO (1999-2009): between Historical Memory and 
challenges of the Future”, in A. Carati, C. Frappi (eds.), NATO in the 60th Anniversary 
of the North Atlantic Treaty. Challenges and strategic divergences from national perspectives, 
Milano, FrancoAngeli-ISPI, 2009, p. 155. 
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events in Ukraine, in particular its negative assessment of Russia’s 
actions in Crimea and Donbas is not surprising. The events in 
Ukraine are not perceived in Poland as part of NATO’s strategy 
aimed at the ‘disintegration of Russia’. On the contrary, in Poland 
the conflict is strongly viewed as an indication of Russian 
expansionism, and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula as an 
unprecedented forced change to borderlines set in Europe after 
1945. Despite the best intentions of those circles in Poland and 
Russia that would like to improve their mutual relations, despite 
the appreciation of the importance of Russia as a great state with a 
unique identity as well as a significant cultural heritage, the 
contemporary realities cannot lead to positive conclusions, 
especially in the context of the dispute over Ukraine in the years 
2014-2015. The reality is that the relationship between Poland and 
Russia has in fact deteriorated significantly, thus:  
Polish-Russian relations suffer under persistently difficult 
ambiguities. They concern the ‘deregulation’ of activeness of 
both countries within the post-Soviet sphere (with special 
emphasis on Ukraine and Belarus), but also the precise 
definition of the scope of economic cooperation, and finally the 
defining of objective differences on key issues such as energy 
security. To this should be added that controversial issues in 
relations with Russia should be solved within the framework of 
‘Ostpolitik’, not only that of Poland, but implemented as part of 
the policy of the whole European Union
10
. 
There are still a lot of unresolved historical issues that seem to 
hinder normalization of the relations with some countries, like 
Poland, at least in the short term. However, it is hard to depict 
Eastern Europe as a homogeneous entity in its relations towards 
Russia, since each country has its own national policy determined 
by its economic and political priorities. 
                                                     
10 S. Bielański, “La Polonia tra Europa e Russia”, Quaderni di Relazioni Internazionali, 
no. 13, Milano, ISPI, 2010, pp. 66-67. 
5. Seen from Moscow: 
Greater Europe at Risk  
Ivan Timofeev 
As already mentioned in the previous chapter, the idea of a 
Greater Europe is not recent. Already in the 1980s, Mikhail 
Gorbachev introduced this concept referring to the existence of a 
“Common European Home”. Later on, Boris Yeltsin further 
developed it and since 2001 Vladimir Putin has again championed 
this project, stressing the need and the importance to create an 
integrated common space from Lisbon to Vladivostok. To this 
aim, Russia’s Eurasian vocation as a bridge between Europe and 
Asia has played a crucial role. Recently, it partially came true with 
the launch of the Eurasian Economic Union on 1
st
 January  2015. 
Indeed, the Eurasian Union is supposed to become an integral part 
of the projected Common European space. This would finally 
realize Russia’s Eurasian goal as Putin stated it in Izvestiya in 
2011: 
Russia and the EU agreed to form a common economic space 
and coordinate economic regulations without the establishment 
of supranational structures back in 2003. In line with this idea, 
we proposed setting up a harmonized community of economies 
stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok, a free trade zone and 
even employing more sophisticated integration patterns. We also 
proposed pursuing coordinated policies in industry, technology, 
the energy sector, education, science, and also to eventually 
scrap visas. These proposals have not been left hanging in 
midair; our European colleagues are discussing them in detail. 
Soon the Customs Union, and later the Eurasian Union, will join 
the dialogue with the EU. As a result, apart from bringing direct 
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economic benefits, accession to the Eurasian Union will also 
help countries integrate into Europe sooner and from a stronger 
position
1
.  
A better understanding of the potential positive outcomes of this 
geopolitical and geo-economic dynamic is not only analytically 
relevant, but could also help European countries and Russia to 
elaborate more effective strategies to develop a more cooperative 
relationship both among themselves and with other countries of 
the region. 
Obstacles on the way to Greater Europe 
For over 20 years the idea of building a Greater Europe has been a 
significant landmark along the way to cooperation in the Euro-
Atlantic region. However, its concrete fulfillment faces at least 
three fundamental problems. 
The first one concerns security issues. How best to resolve the 
‘security dilemma’ between Russia and NATO, as well as that 
between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community as a whole? 
How to build a common security space? The answers to these 
questions require solving a whole bunch of problems, including 
the enlargement of NATO, ways to settle local conflicts, control 
over nuclear and conventional weapons, the missile defense issue 
and many others. The second one is of an economic kind. It 
pertains to the measures to be taken to align the economic 
potential of the EU, Russia, and the post-Soviet states. These are 
key to achieving a mutually interdependent economy in Greater 
Europe as well as to creating a common humanitarian space with 
the participation of Russia and other post-Soviet states. The third 
one relates to the post-Soviet space itself and deals with 
reconciliation of Russia’s strategic interests in the post-Soviet 
                                                     
1 Article by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin “A new integration project for Eurasia: 
The future in the making”, Izvestia, 3 October 2011, 
http://www.russianmission.eu/en/news/article-prime-minister-vladimir-putin-new-
integration-project-eurasia-future-making-izvestia-3-. 
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space with EU and NATO enlargement plans as well as the 
sovereign choices of certain post-communist countries. 
The end of the Cold War brought down the curtain on bloc 
confrontation. Nevertheless, it did not guarantee the solution of the 
aforesaid problems. On the contrary, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union has seriously exacerbated them. For twenty years we have 
seen a consistent narrowing of the window of opportunity to 
address these issues. The narrowness of this window became 
apparent by the late 2000s, even before the Ukrainian crisis and 
the stagnation of Russia’s relations with both NATO and the EU. 
Success stories have been few and far between, and their 
cumulative effect could not deliver a qualitative breakthrough. 
Indeed, virtually no issues in the security sphere have been 
solved. NATO’s consistent enlargement ignored Russia’s concern, 
at least as it is viewed from Moscow. Initiatives in the field of 
conventional arms control have reached deadlock. Local conflicts 
have not been settled by joint effort and, at best, they currently 
remain frozen. The strategic stability system is worsening (missile 
defense, prompt global strike initiatives, etc.) and nuclear 
deterrence remains the key guarantor of security (at least, for 
Russia). Indeed, post-Soviet states have become an arena for 
competition, rather than cooperation. 
The situation in the economic and humanitarian spheres is 
better, but progress in this area has also largely been exhausted. 
Therefore, it is true that economic and humanitarian integration 
achieved certain results, but it has generally failed to deliver. This 
has been due to EU enlargement, the problem of multi-speed 
European integration and asymmetrical economic cooperation. 
Finally, energy cooperation seems politicized (i.e. 3
rd
 Energy 
Package, transit routes).  
At the same time, the fundamental issue of harmonizing post-
Soviet states’ integration plans has not been resolved. The post-
Soviet space has become an arena of cutting the ties that bind 
along new dividing lines. In most cases, it has involved a clear-cut 
choice between Western and nominal Russian projects. 
Institutions and formats that could harmonize these processes have 
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failed to materialize. The principle of new states’ sovereignty, 
which is undoubtedly correct from a formal standpoint, has de 
facto ignored the great number of obvious and hidden problems in 
post-Soviet states, including economic development, good 
governance, ethnic divisions, and open and latent conflicts. Formal 
sovereignty came under heavy pressure from internal problems 
and increased competition from major players. 
All these problems had emerged before early 2014. However, 
the situation in Ukraine has led to their dramatic and cumulative 
aggravation. For the first time in 25 years, a local crisis in one 
country has shattered the whole system of relations between 
Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community. 
What remains to be lost 
The tragedy is that even the theoretical options to solve at least 
some of the above-mentioned issues risk being quickly and 
irreversibly extinguished. There is a rapid radicalization of 
relations, which affects even those areas where cooperation 
seemed to be at hand. A year and a half ago the window of 
opportunity was narrow, but at least it was open. Now it seems to 
be closed indefinitely. In this regard, it is worthwhile highlighting 
some of the problems and missed opportunities in key fields. 
 
Security  
Europe and Russia should work together on reducing the risks of a 
nuclear conflict. In the short and medium terms increasing nuclear 
deterrence, information transparency, confidence-building 
measures are unlikely to see any positive development. In the 
worst-case scenario, a number of basic agreements will be reduced 
to nothing. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty (INF) is 
particularly at risk. One of the most alarming tendencies is the 
construction of a direct and formal connection between the 
conflict over Ukraine and the INF. This has never been a problem 
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before. There has been an on-going discussion between Russia and 
the U.S. on implementation of the treaty, but the INF itself has 
been treated as a separate track. It has not been correlated with 
other issues. However the U.S. Ukraine Freedom Support Act 
establishes such a link (section 10 of the Act). The danger is that 
Russia may be subjected to sanctions if it is suspected of violating 
the treaty. The mechanism of sanctions is not clearly stated in the 
Act in regard to INF. But the very spirit of the Act and the fact 
that INF has become a part of Ukrainian affairs is a matter of 
tremendous concern. This may undermine the treaty, which has 
been a fundamental achievement in Russia-West relations. 
Consequently, it will make Europe much less secure, promoting 
the arms race in a very sensitive sphere.  
In particular, the dialogue on missile defense should be 
continued. Worsening relations with Russia could trigger the 
deployment of missile defenses in Europe as well as Russia’s 
response to neutralize the potential threat to its nuclear forces. If 
earlier the parties managed to find a compromise, now the 
situation may result in an arms race, and the absence of any 
interaction. There is a risk that missile defense will be approached 
as a means to contain Russia. This justifies Russia’s old fears and 
suspicions about the ‘real aims’ of the program and undermines 
trust, which is already close to zero. Tentative ideas on joint 
institutions to manage and operate missile defense as a measure of 
trust will hardly get back on the agenda in the foreseeable future.  
Russia and NATO relations represent another crucial issue. 
Institutional mechanisms are phased out. The NATO-Russia 
Council (NRC) raised many questions and aroused censure. But it 
left open the possibility to exchange views and coordinate 
positions. This platform is now frozen indefinitely. Meanwhile, 
this could be a mechanism to reduce the risk of a political 
escalation, caused by unintended accidents between Russia and 
NATO arms forces.  
At the same time the dialogue on Conventional Forces in 
Europe is mired in deadlock. In the short and mid-term 
perspective, we are likely to witness a conventional arms race and 
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local manifestations in the form of military aid from Russia and 
the West to the parties involved in the conflict in Ukraine. We will 
also witness a military build-up on both sides, which will 
negatively affect European security. Needless to say, such a trend 
will result in growing military expenditures and an ensuing shift of 
scarce resources from a development to a security agenda. This is 
harmful for Ukraine, Russia, the EU and the U.S. as well. 
Similarly, the issue of U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike 
(CPGS) is likely to go beyond discussion. It may now be 
considered a mechanism to contain Russia via the prospect of 
retaliation. Russia cannot counterbalance the challenge with 
equivalent means. But Russian military doctrine implies that this 
challenge can be responded to by means of nuclear weapons if an 
attack using conventional forces against Russia threatens its 
existence as a state. No doubt, the development of global strike 
capabilities as well as Russian nuclear forces under conditions of 
zero-trust will severely undermine Euro-Atlantic security. In fact, 
it may revive the idea of limited nuclear strikes both in Russia and 
in the West. It is noteworthy that during the Cold War these ideas 
were carefully analyzed by both sides. They were rejected as 
suicidal due to the high probability of quick escalation to a large-
scale nuclear conflict. Whether this conclusion will be made again 
is a matter of question.   
Moreover, the interaction on cyber-security issues also faces 
some serious problems. The digital environment has been 
transforming into a field of bitter rivalry. Regulation initiatives, in 
the current situation, are unlikely to see any development. At the 
same time, cyberspace is becoming more and more crucial for 
national security. Russia, the EU and the U.S. remain vulnerable 
in terms of cyber threats. The absence of cooperation will increase 
this vulnerability. Moreover, cyberspace may become a field of 
hidden rivalry between them. 
As far as cooperation in space is concerned, we are likely to 
witness a new wave of militarization and scaling down of 
multilateral cooperation. There is the possibility of reviving 
satellite interception programs and other programs involving the 
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militarization of near-earth orbit. Cooperation in space – one of 
the achievements of the late 1980s and beyond – may be halted in 
the future. Paradoxically, this may damage the most developed 
armed forces, due to their increased dependence on space 
navigation and opportunities, provided by space.   
The local booms in the arms race, which are likely to take 
place in the Black Sea and Baltic regions, are also a possible 
threat. They will be determined by the dynamics of the Ukrainian 
crisis in the Black Sea region, and the mutual aggravation of the 
situation by Baltic NATO member states and Russia in the Baltic 
region. The key danger is the risk of escalating local arms races 
into regional ones. If this scenario will come true, any military 
training in these areas will be politicized by both sides. This will 
further increase fear, undermining trust. These dynamics can also 
contribute to ‘freezing’ and aggravating the local conflicts. 
Prospects for the multilateral settlement of the conflict in Ukraine 
are becoming more remote. A new round of hostilities is quite 
likely. This likelihood increases if the sides of the conflict will be 
actively armed, trained and supplied. The Nagorno-Karabakh and 
Transnistrian conflicts could escalate along with the Ukrainian.  
Consequently even the cooperation in solving non-regional 
problems achieved in the past years, where Russia and Europe can 
boast some positive and important results, is proceeding at a 
slower pace. The probability of successful multilateral action to 
address common problems and counter common threats, as with 
interaction on Afghanistan, the Syrian chemical weapons issue and 
others, is reduced. The Ukrainian crisis has even affected 
cooperation in the Arctic, where international interactions have 
been more or less depoliticized. Meanwhile, the problems, which 
need joint action, will not just fade away by themselves. They will 
be accumulating to explode one day or another. 
Economic and humanitarian cooperation  
Divergence in the economic trajectories of Russia, the EU and 
other European countries is unlikely to strengthen their global 
competitiveness. This is particularly true for Russia whose 
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economy is not sufficiently diversified. But it is also important for 
a stagnating EU that is losing the Russian market. Interregional 
cooperation is likely to suffer, affecting the feasibility of the 
“Europe of Regions” concept. Interregional relations may well 
suffer from the sharp deterioration of the political situation. 
Sanctions imposed by both sides are a key negative factor, which 
undermines the economic interdependence of Russia, the EU and 
other countries in the region. Sanctions will curtail interaction or 
substantially increase transaction costs. More specifically, 
financial sanctions will negatively affect the Russian economy. 
However, they will damage the EU economy too, also due to the 
connection of EU exports to Russia with Russia’s access to the EU 
financial market. Due to sanctions, Russia will not have access to 
a large number of European technologies and investments, thereby 
losing one growth source. The European Union and other 
countries in the region are already confronted with losing markets, 
lack of key impetus for their industrial growth and reduction of 
their export potential. Finally, the process of harmonizing Russian 
and European standards in various fields, albeit very uneven in the 
past, may be at risk of a slowdown. 
One of the major fields is no doubt energy security. Europe’s 
energy security is undermined. Transit routes through Ukraine will 
become an object of constant political manipulation. The collapse 
of the South Stream gas pipeline project increases instability. 
Russia will gradually lose the European gas market. The EU will 
lose Russia as a traditionally reliable partner.  
Similarly, the humanitarian field, specifically educational and 
scientific cooperation, can also be affected by political conflicts 
and economic sanctions. At the very least, we should expect a 
decrease in funding for multilateral programs and projects by the 
EU and individual European countries on the one hand and by 
Russia on the other. 
The issue of liberalizing the visa regime between Russia and 
the EU will, at best, be frozen. At worst, both sides will impose 
travel restrictions. This will deal a blow to close social and human 
relations that create the living fabric of the future Greater Europe. 
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Reducing travel and exchanges will only exacerbate reciprocal 
stereotyping and hostility. Liberalizing the visa regime for 
Ukrainians will aggravate the situation, widen the gap, intensify 
polarization and deepen dividing lines. The ability to exert joint 
control over migration flows will also be badly hit. The Ukrainian 
crisis engenders the problem of refugees and illegal migration, 
hitting both sides. The lack of cooperation in this sphere will, 
finally, increase the price of resolving this problem. 
More generally, in terms of European perception, Russia is 
regaining the status of a ‘significant other’ (“Russia is not 
Europe”). A similar process will gain momentum in Russia. This 
gap will be maintained and widened by the media, the education 
system and other institutions, making the split long-term. It is 
noteworthy that a similar tendency is also occurring with Turkey 
(though due to different reasons). Indeed, Ankara seems to be 
rethinking its ‘European’ vocation as well.  
Interaction in the post-Soviet space 
Only multilateral cooperation can solve important regional issues. 
Russia, the EU, the U.S., and other actors are unlikely to help the 
post-Soviet countries in resolving existing conflicts and 
contradictions single-handedly. Such unilateral efforts are sure to 
be opposed by one of the parties, and this is particularly true for 
the conflict in Ukraine. 
While major transparency would help provide better 
integration, the dividing lines in the post-Soviet space – 
restricting, in particular, freedom of movement – will damage 
labor and student migration. This will lead to economic losses and 
the general degradation of human resources. This may be the case 
for Ukraine. 
It goes without saying that instability in the post-Soviet space 
will prevent the formation of full-fledged sovereign states. By 
‘sovereignty’ we mean here the ability to pursue an independent 
political course, to govern one’s own territory efficiently, and to 
be self-supporting. Ukraine again offers an illustrative example. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union that country had a unique 
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development opportunity. Free from the diverse cumbersome 
problems that Russia faced, the country was large and developed 
enough to play its own economic and political role. This unique 
opportunity was missed. 
That is why measures need to be taken in order to strengthen 
cooperation between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union. 
The interaction between the EU and the Eurasian Economic 
Community loses many of its prospects if the political differences 
between Russia and the European Union continue to gain 
momentum. The project of Eurasian economic integration is often 
treated as a “geo-political project of Moscow”. Such an approach 
obscures opportunities of economic collaboration with this 
emerging regional project for all the actors that could be involved. 
Finally, it is necessary to work out a common strategy in 
resolving issues in the former Soviet countries in order to maintain 
economic ties and stability. Rivalry in the post-Soviet space is 
fraught with the risk of incurring expenses in most countries, and 
particularly Ukraine. The consistent severance of ties with the 
Russian market deprives Ukraine of an important source of 
growth. Russia also pays a price, as it is forced to spend resources 
to substitute Ukrainian imports. The European Union will 
probably have to pay an even greater price to protect Ukraine from 
financial and economic collapse. Severing economic ties with 
Russia deprives other countries in the post-Soviet space of sources 
of growth. Though the Russian economy faces recession, its 
market is still an opportunity for the post-Soviet states.  
Conclusion 
The further deepening of the dividing lines is sure to inflict serious 
damage on all interested parties. The European Union, Russia and 
post-Soviet states are bound to suffer, as are other regional actors 
such as Turkey. Despite increasing political tension, we should 
revive the idea of building a Greater Europe. 
At the moment the idea of a Greater Europe may seem utopian 
for many. However, without values and ideological guidelines, 
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any rational pragmatism and realism will hang suspended. Without 
such guidelines, any pragmatic activity carried out by a country 
resembles “rats in the garbage” – i.e. the shortsighted use of 
available opportunities without any long-term thinking.  
In contrast, the presence of a common unifying idea makes 
pragmatism meaningful and focused on attaining common long-
term goals. 
What exactly can be done to realize the idea of a Greater 
Europe and avoid taking situation-based, chaotic and hostile steps? 
The minimum required steps seem to be as follows. 
In the field of security it is necessary to refrain from provoking 
actions in the military sphere, namely the build-up of military 
forces, dangerous approaches by military aircraft, warships, etc. It 
is also important to carry out military exercises and maneuvers in 
contact zones between Russian and NATO forces in a mutually 
predictable way. 
Russia and the U.S. should separate the Ukrainian crisis from 
other security issues and existing treaties like INF. 
All the sides concerned should spare no effort in achieving a 
cease-fire in Ukraine, promoting negotiations between the 
conflicting parties and reaching a long-term solution to the conflict 
by re-shaping the country’s territorial structure, or by other means 
acceptable to the parties to the conflict. Under the current 
conditions, it implies the multilateral support and promotion of the 
Minsk agreements.  
To this aim, it would be wise to establish a mechanism of 
regular multilateral consultations (contact groups) on the crisis in 
Europe. It is crucially important to have a regular format for Euro-
Atlantic leaders’ interaction to manage the existing crisis.  
The issue of the Treaty on European Security, as well as the 
reform of the OSCE should be put back on the agenda. The very 
fact of discussion may help to rebuild at least some level of trust.  
The work of the NATO-Russia Council should be resumed and 
in addition to its use for Ukraine it should serve again as a 
discussion forum to address issues of common threats and 
challenges. 
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In the field of economic and humanitarian cooperation a joint 
program of humanitarian aid to the Ukrainian regions in need of it 
should be developed and launched (possibly under the auspices of 
the OSCE). At the same time, the EU and Russia should work out 
a mechanism for joint action on economic aid to Ukraine, 
addressing the consequences of the current financial and economic 
crisis. 
Mutual visa discrimination and the extension of political 
controversies to cooperation in education, science and other areas 
of cultural interaction should be vigorously opposed. Similarly, 
systemic discussion of ‘controversial issues’ in relations between 
Russia, the EU and certain European states at the level of 
universities, research centers and the national councils on foreign 
relations should be launched (Track 2 and Track 1.5). 
In the field of interaction in the post-Soviet space a dialogue on 
multilateral security guarantees for post-Soviet states should be 
reestablished at least at Track 2 level. Discussion of the topic on 
the political level is hardly possible now. But experts should have 
a longer-sighted view compared to politicians. 
The issue of multilateral rapid response mechanisms to crises 
in the post-Soviet space should be taken into consideration.  
Finally, an inventory of political, economic and humanitarian 
projects in Russia, the EU and other countries in the post-Soviet 
space should be drawn up. It is necessary to determine the points 
of contact and synchronize them, putting some of these projects in 
a multilateral mode whenever possible. 
In practical terms, it seems necessary to run a detailed study of 
these and other proposals by leading think tanks in the countries 
concerned.
6. The Logic of U.S. Engagement: 
Talking to Russia -  
and European Allies in the Lead 
Sean Kay 
The continuing crisis in Ukraine raises fundamental questions 
about how best for the United States to engage with adversaries 
and allies. This chapter examines the American approach to 
engaging Russia before and during the Ukraine crisis. It shows 
that Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea has added greater 
cohesion to the West while accelerating a rebalancing of 
responsibility sharing between the United States and Europe. The 
United States has calibrated its approach towards Russia so as to 
sustain engagement while putting capable allies in lead diplomatic, 
economic, and military roles. A careful mix of political and 
economic punishment, diplomatic engagement, and symbolic 
reassurance of NATO members provides a framework for limiting 
the damage done by Russia’s irresponsible behavior. At the same 
time, as the 2013 crisis over Syria’s use of chemical weapons and 
the 2015 Iran nuclear bargaining showed, America works with 
Moscow when interests align. Meanwhile, as the United States 
continues with its ‘Asia Pivot’, the need for European allies to 
assume an even greater role will accelerate – not with more 
spending on defense, but with pooling of military capabilities. 
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The benefits of talking with adversaries 
The United States has often sought to isolate governments not 
adhering to international norms.  At the same time, however, 
America diplomatically engaged the Soviet Union, and then 
Russia, as common national interests meant talking. For example, 
the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrates the benefits of 
engagement and bargaining. John F. Kennedy took a tough stance 
against the Soviet Union’s delivery of nuclear missiles to Cuba, 
declaring that an attack from Cuba would be considered as if it 
were an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States. But, he 
also ruled out an invasion and negotiated a deal: the United States 
would not invade Cuba, would remove its own missiles from 
Turkey, and the Soviet Union withdrew its missiles from Cuba. 
Subsequently, Richard M. Nixon opened the door to communist 
China which changed Cold War geopolitics by dividing Moscow 
and Beijing. Ronald Reagan negotiated with the Soviet Union to 
wind down the Cold War. Bill Clinton worked to enlarge NATO 
but also to bring Russia into the European security framework, 
offering Moscow concessions it never would have merited on its 
own, like joining the G8. Bill Clinton remained engaged with 
Boris Yeltsin even as his regime embraced a military doctrine 
supporting intervention in the ‘near abroad’ to protect the rights of 
some 22 million Russian minorities living outside of Russia; 
leveled Chechnya; became autocratic; applied loose rhetoric about 
the use of nuclear weapons; and elevated Vladimir Putin to 
Russia’s leadership. George W. Bush quickly returned to normal 
relations with Russia after it invaded the Republic of Georgia. 
Barack Obama set out to ‘reset’ U.S.-Russian relations, which 
paid dividends over sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program1. Despite 
the illegal Russian annexation of Crimea in early 2014, the 
Western allies have maintained diplomatic engagement and 
calibrated political and economic responses while ruling out a 
military solution. The clear objective of the U.S. and its European 
                                                     
1. See D. Nexon, “The ‘Failure of the Reset’: Obama’s Great Mistake, or Putin’s”, 
The Washington Post, 4 March 2014. 
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allies has been de-escalation and offering ‘off-ramps’ to Russia 
from which it could turn away from its new pariah status in world 
affairs. 
In the American context making concessions to adversaries, 
even when done from a position of strength, has become 
politically difficult. Often anything short of complete isolation or 
capitulation has been politically equated with appeasement, 
alluding to concessions made to Hitler before World War II. 
America had historically never previously considered places like 
Eastern Europe as important, let alone vital, national interests. Yet, 
in 1996 the Clinton Administration embarked on a new strategy of 
spreading Western visions of democracy and multilateral 
cooperation. The 1996 national security strategy declared: “While 
democracy will not soon take hold everywhere, it is in our interest 
to do all that we can to enlarge the community of free and open 
societies, especially in areas of greatest strategic interest, as in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the new independent states of the 
former Soviet Union”2. Spreading democracy via a military 
alliance into what Russia perceived as its sphere of influence was 
a major change in America’s strategic concept. The United States 
did not intervene to help pro-western uprisings in Hungary in 
1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Poland in 1981. Even before 
Mikhail Gorbachev reformed the Soviet Union, Ronald Reagan 
believed in the engagement and reassurance of Moscow. He wrote 
in his private diary in 1983, after a Soviet scare over NATO 
nuclear exercises that: “I feel the Soviets are so defense minded, 
so paranoid about being attacked that without being in any way 
soft on them we ought to tell them that no one here has any 
intention of doing anything like that. What the h–l have they got 
that anyone would want”3. 
Both liberal internationalists in the Clinton administration and 
neoconservatives in the George W. Bush administration embraced 
a new narrative of American power and leadership via NATO 
                                                     
2 Details are available at http://www.fas .orgspp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htl. 
3 D. Birtch, “The USSR and the US Came Closer to Nuclear War Than We 
Thought”, The Atlantic, 28 May 2013. 
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enlargement. Alternative approaches to consolidating stability in 
Central and Eastern Europe, like the compromise Partnership for 
Peace (which created a process of affiliation with the alliance), 
were characterized as appeasement even though at the time the 
Soviet Union had collapsed and Russia’s economy and military 
were in free-fall. The Partnership for Peace was described by a 
senior Polish leader saying: “We’ve gone from Chamberlain’s 
umbrella to Clinton’s saxophone”4. U.S. Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright labeled those who opposed NATO’s 
enlargement as reflecting ‘echoes of Munich’ and she suggested 
support for policies like NATO enlargement were a ‘litmus test’ 
for whether America would “remain internationalist […] or retreat 
into isolationism”5. As Vice-President, Richard Cheney took this 
thinking a step further, saying in 2003: “I have been charged by 
the President with making sure that none of the tyrannies in the 
world are negotiated with […] we don’t negotiate with evil; we 
defeat it”6. 
This vision, as seen from NATO’s view, reflected a benign 
desire to use multilateral cooperation to enhance stability in post-
Cold War Europe. With time, however, average Russians 
internalized a belief that the West failed to respect Russia’s 
legitimate concerns regarding their immediate neighborhood. For 
many Russians there is a little difference between their vision and 
America’s approach to the Western Hemisphere via the Monroe 
Doctrine. Still, Senator John McCain said, (speaking in Munich) 
in early 2015, of America’s closest allies’ effort to advance a 
cease-fire in eastern Ukraine: “History shows us that dictators will 
always take more if you let them […] They will not be dissuaded 
from their brutal behavior when you fly to meet them to Moscow 
                                                     
4 S. Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security, Lanham, MD., Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1999, pp. 71-72. 
5 D. Broder, “Some NATO Expansion Arguments are Disturbing”, The Washington 
Post, 19 July 1997. 
6 L.H. Gelb, “In the End, Every President Talks to the Bad Guys”, The Washington 
Post, 27 April 2008. 
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– just as leaders once flew to this city”7. At the same time, as 
Henry Kissinger said in February 2015: “I’m uneasy about 
beginning a process of military engagement without knowing 
where it will lead us and what we’ll do to sustain it […] I believe 
we should avoid taking incremental steps before we know how far 
we are willing to go… This is a territory 300 miles from Moscow, 
and therefore has special security implications”8. Political scientist 
John J. Mearsheimer put it succinctly: “Such a step is especially 
dangerous because Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons and 
is seeking to defend a vital strategic interest”9. 
The strategy of Western victory and adversarial defeat in 
diplomacy came to a breaking point over the 2013 Syria crisis. 
Syria used chemical weapons to kill about 1,300 civilians 
including hundreds of children. After the British Parliament 
rejected participation in a U.S. cruise missile attack to punish 
Syria, a window opened in which diplomatic engagement with 
Russia led to a better outcome. The United States and Russia 
negotiated an intrusive international inspection regime to 
successfully remove all declared chemical weapons from Syria. 
The prospects for an even modest success of weapons inspections 
were more substantial than the utility of a limited cruise missile 
strike (as had been the announced plan). As military historian 
Edward Luttwack wrote, weapons inspectors “might miss quite a 
few chemical warheads and bombs if they are hidden well enough. 
But that’s no less true of any attempt to eliminate Syria’s chemical 
weapons by bombing depots and bases – some are bound to escape 
detection and destruction, not to mention the potential for a 
dangerous dispersal of chemical agents in a strike”. Moreover, 
Luttwack concluded: “Tehran’s greatest fear is American and 
Russian cooperation. Especially now that economic sanctions have 
actually been effective, Iranian leaders might finally accept real 
                                                     
7 J. Huggler, “Ukraine Crisis: U.S. Officials Compare Peace Efforts to Appeasing 
Hitler”, The Telegraph, 8 February 2015. 
8 “Henry Kissinger, Mikhail Gorbachev Separately Warn about Ukraine Crisis 
Blowing Out of Control”, National Post, 30 January 2015.  
9 J.J. Mearsheimer, “Don’t Arm Ukraine”, New York Times, 8 February 2015. 
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limits on their nuclear activities once they see Americans and 
Russians cooperating effectively in Syria”10. The Syria events are 
indicative of a broader dilemma. In terms of escalation, Moscow 
has tactical dominance and multiple options to retaliate against the 
U.S. and Europe. Russian gas flows into Europe, constraining the 
extent to which the allies wish to escalate, given the ongoing 
Eurozone crisis. Meanwhile, there is most likely no outcome 
favorable to the United States in places like North Korea, 
Afghanistan, Iran, and Syria that does not involve Russian 
cooperation. 
The Ukraine crisis and the West 
As the West pursued enlargement of integrative institutions like 
NATO and the European Union, Russian elites and the public 
increasingly came to a perception that America had broken a 
pledge that, once Germany was united in NATO, there would be 
no further expansion of the alliance
11
. As Daniel Deudney and G. 
John Ikenberry write: “ […] much of this souring is the result of 
American policies […] American foreign policy, so successful at 
the moment of settlement, has pursued goals contrary to the 
settlement’s principles. This occurred through the administrations 
of both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush as the United States 
pursued short-term and secondary aims at the expense of more 
fundamental interests”12. The American approach to post-Cold 
War order-building in Europe offered a mixed record. NATO 
membership, for example, did help to consolidate stability in 
Poland as a geopolitical bridge between a rising Germany and 
declining Russia. The first round of NATO enlargement (which 
included Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) produced 
                                                     
10 E. Luttwack, “Take It and Like It”, Foreign Policy, 10 September 2013. 
11 See J.R. Shifrinson, “Put it in Writing: How the West Broke It’s Promise to Moscow”, 
Foreign Affairs, 29 October 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142310/joshua-r-
itzkowitz-shifrinson/put-it-in-writing. 
12 D. Duedney, G.J. Ikenberry, “The Unravelling of the Cold War Settlement”, 
Survival, vol. 51, issue 6, 2009, p. 49. 
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gains for Russia as it received commitments of no permanent 
large-scale allied conventional or nuclear deployments in new 
NATO members; a NATO-Russia Founding Act created 
opportunities for deeper engagement with the West; and Russia 
was invited to join the G8 group of leading industrial powers. The 
second round of NATO enlargement (which included Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) also 
did not produce a major backlash in Russia, and offered Moscow 
further gains with the creation of a permanent NATO-Russia 
Council. Now, with Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Moscow lost its 
role in the G8 and NATO-Russia cooperation was suspended. 
Vladimir Putin is thus doing great damage to average Russians’ 
desire to be seen with respect in the world. Nevertheless it is also 
the case that, over a twenty-year period, a deeply negative view of 
the West came to exist in Russia, heightened by classic Russian 
elite manipulation of existential external threats for domestic 
political gains. By 2015, Russians had a 42 per cent favorable 
view of China, and just a 6 and 4 per cent favorable view of 
Europe and the United States respectively
13
.  
Some American officials note that because Ukrainian 
membership in NATO was not on the agenda in the years prior to 
2014, it could not have been a causal factor. However, many 
serious outside observers see it as the tap root of the crisis
14
. 
External actions can have internal political effects – in this case, 
heightening views among Russians that NATO is an existential 
threat. For example, American officials point to legalisms to show 
that the West did not break a promise to Mikhail Gorbachev that, 
once Germany was unified, there would be no further enlargement 
of NATO. However, what the NATO members think of that is not 
really relevant to how most Russians feel about the issue and thus 
                                                     
13 J. Ray, N. Esipova, “Russia Approval of Putin Soars to Highest Level in Years”, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/173597/russian-approval-putin-soars-highest-level-years.aspx.  
14 For a key debate over this issue, see M. McFaul, J.J. Mearsheimer, S. Sestanovich, “Faulty 
Powers: Who Started the Ukraine Crisis?”, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2014, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142260/michael-mcfaul-stephen-sestanovich-john-
j-mearsheimer/faulty-powers. 
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how they define their interests
15
. NATO officials have not helped 
in terms of providing clarity over Ukraine. Officials from member 
states, especially Germany, have made clear that Ukraine will not 
be joining NATO. Yet the 2008 Ukraine and Georgia declaration 
remains official alliance policy. Ukraine officially declared NATO 
membership its goal in 2014, breaking a prior commitment to 
neutrality. In spring 2014, NATO Deputy Secretary General, 
Alexander Vershbow, said in a speech in Vilnius that: “NATO 
enlargement has not exhausted itself. It has been a resounding 
success, it has made Europe – including Russia – more secure , and 
it remains a central pillar of NATO’s future”. In spring 2015, 
Vershbow visited Tbilisi, Georgia and tweeted, “All tools in place 
to help #Georgia move from #NATO partnership to membership. 
W/ necessary political commitment, I’m sure it will happen”. 
When asked on Twitter how this could be if the NATO allies were 
not in consensus, Vershbow responded that the decision was made 
in Budapest in 2008. 
Yet in Ukraine there is little popular support for a 
confrontational approach towards Russia or for alignment with 
Western institutions. As pollster Stephen Kull summarized a series 
of early 2015 public opinion data points in Ukraine: “The 
movement toward the EU, supported by Ukrainians in the Western 
and Northern parts of the country, has provoked a reaction in the 
Eastern part of the country that Russia has effectively exploited”. 
Kull adds that 63 per cent of Ukrainians favored a neutral position 
between Europe and Russia, only 48 per cent of Ukrainians 
favored using military force to retake ground lost to Russian-
backed rebels in eastern Ukraine, and only 4 out of 10 Ukrainians 
favored aspirations to join NATO
16
. Meanwhile, Ukraine is not 
remotely close to NATO membership criteria, in particular that 
requiring the settlement of border disputes. Keeping eastern 
Ukraine unstable enough so as to shape Ukraine’s foreign policy 
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directions, while keeping NATO divided on the issue, is a likely 
Russian goal. Since the NATO allies have no intention of actually 
having Ukraine join NATO, they illogically risked incurring 
unnecessary costs by holding on to an ideal of Ukrainian NATO 
membership. Worse, they signaled dangerous false promises to the 
Ukrainian people. 
A preference for spheres of influence and buffer zones in 
Ukraine was a clear redline for the Russians, which NATO policy 
drove right over with the alliance’s 2008 declaration that Ukraine 
and Georgia would eventually become NATO members
17
. 
Advocates of the NATO open door for a democratic Ukraine did 
so out of an idealist-based moral goal that is laudable. But, as 
former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, wrote in his 2014 
Memoir Duty:   
Getting Gorbachev to acquiesce to a unified Germany as a 
member of NATO had been a huge accomplishment. But 
moving so quickly after the collapse of the Soviet Union to 
incorporate so many of its formerly subjugated states into NATO 
was a mistake. Quickly including the Baltic states, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary was the right thing to do, but I 
believe the process should then have slowed […] Trying to bring 
Georgia and Ukraine into NATO was truly overreaching. The 
roots of the Russian Empire trace back to Kiev in the ninth 
century, so that was an especially monumental provocation.  
Were the Europeans, much less the Americans, willing to send 
their sons and daughters to defend Ukraine or Georgia? Hardly 
[...] NATO expansion was a political act, not a carefully 
considered military commitment, thus undermining the purpose 
of the alliance and recklessly ignoring what the Russians 
considered their own vital national interests
18
. 
Meanwhile, the United States had long believed it was important 
that the enlargement of the European Union was an additional key 
ingredient to order-building alongside NATO. Russia too had 
seemingly taken a less assertive tone towards the European Union. 
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Nevertheless, in late 2013, it was the European Union, via a trade 
negotiation with Ukraine, which was at the heart of the crisis. 
America clearly felt that the EU was not taking a sufficiently 
strategic view towards Ukraine by pushing too hard a line over its 
deep economic liabilities. “F*** the EU”, was the rather 
undiplomatic language used by American Assistant Secretary of 
State, Victoria Nuland
19
. When the existing pro-Russian 
government in Kiev opted instead to turn towards Moscow in late 
2013, rather than towards the European Union, the Maidan 
protests and revolution accelerated. 
The U.S. and Europe: a new burdensharing 
This dismissive attitude towards the European Union was a legacy 
of America’s sense of primacy and its strong preference that, after 
the Cold War, NATO should remain the primary European 
security institution. The idea of building a European-only military 
capacity was resisted strongly by the United States. This was, 
however, a paradox because the United States also wanted more 
burdensharing contributions from its allies. American policy, 
beginning in the 1990s, was to encourage the European members 
of NATO to develop “separable, but not separate” capabilities. 
The unintended result, however, was a steep decline in European 
defense investment, while deepening the dependence on U.S.-led 
architectures for military operations. As political scientist Barry 
Posen observes, while the United States was (by 2013) spending 
about 4.6 per cent of its gross domestic product on defense, the 
Europeans were spending collectively 1.6 per cent. Posen writes: 
“With their high per capita GDPs, these allies can afford to devote 
more money to their militaries, and yet they have no incentive to 
do so. And while the U.S. government considers draconian cuts in 
social spending to restore the United States’ fiscal health, it 
continues to subsidize the security of Germany […] This is 
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welfare for the rich”20. Nevertheless, the United States has, at the 
same time, been unwilling to change the incentive basis for 
European investment in defense and broader strategic engagement. 
When taken together, the European members of NATO have 
two nuclear powers and over 2 million people collectively in 
uniform. Still, while the U.S. was spending 31 per cent of its 
defense budget on capability investments, the European allies 
spent a combined 22 per cent. Most European defense spending 
was national and not coordinated to allow for specialization and 
thus lower costs
21
. In 2013, for example, France sent 2,400 ground 
troops in an intervention into the African country Mali to combat 
radical Islamic militias with links to al-Qaeda. The French force 
was small – but the remaining total collective European 
contribution was just 450 troops – and limited to a post-crisis 
training mission. France could not sustain the operation alone and 
had to turn to Washington to provide enabling forces. The absence 
of European capability underscored growing costs to the United 
States even when an ally tried to lead. For example, the C-17 
cargo plane, which the U.S. contributed to move French troops 
and equipment cost about $225 million per plane to procure.  This 
cost the U.S. about $4.5 billion in terms of new planes and 
existing maintenance of procurements and about $12,000 per hour 
to fly. Personnel costs run about $385,000 per service member 
associated with each plane – which grow higher with training 
costs for pilots and do not account for retirement and other 
associated long-term benefits
22
. 
Former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, had warned in 
2011 that NATO faced a “dim, if not dismal future” and that 
“there will be a dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. 
Congress – and in the American body politic writ large – to 
expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are 
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apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make 
the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their 
own defense”. Gates added that some allies are “apparently 
willing and eager for American taxpayers to assume the growing 
security burden left by reductions in European defense budgets”23. 
These problems of European dependence on American power 
projection were especially pronounced in areas of enabling forces 
(transport, intelligence, command and control, etc.) for even 
relatively small operations, like the French-led incursion into 
Mali. Meanwhile, European contributions became more and more 
limited – from robust engagement in the Balkan conflicts to just a 
handful of countries in the Libyan war in 2011. This dependence 
was especially problematic given America’s strategic plans to 
pivot to Asia. The Asia pivot requires America to reduce its 
military footprint in other regions while Asia remains steady or 
growing in American diplomatic, trade, and military 
considerations. Given the capacity of allies in Europe to invest in 
their own defense needs, this pivot requires the Persian Gulf to be 
the second major emphasis, and Europe would be third among 
major priorities for important American geopolitical 
considerations. Meanwhile, fiscal realities also require the United 
States to liberate costly overseas military deployments so as to 
invest in the domestic foundations of power. 
There is acute uncertainty among the new NATO allies closer 
to Russia who are nervous about the viability of NATO’s 
collective defense commitments. Secretary of State, John Kerry, 
said in April 2014 that: “ […] together we have to make it 
absolutely clear to the Kremlin that NATO territory is inviolable. 
We will defend every single piece of it […] Article V of the 
NATO treaty must mean something, and our allies on the frontline 
need and deserve no less”24. This statement was a re-interpretation 
both of the NATO treaty and existing NATO defense plans. The 
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NATO treaty is worth re-reading because it is frequently 
interpreted well beyond what Article V actually says: 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of 
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack 
against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an 
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of 
individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of 
the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties 
so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with 
the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the 
use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the 
North Atlantic area
25
. 
This language was intentionally left ambiguous to ensure 
flexibility, promising only to consider an attack on one as an 
attack on all, and consultation over how best to respond
26
. 
Credibly in the Cold War this was achieved with large forward 
deployed ground forces and nuclear weapons. Today, the promise 
is based on reinforcement of a threatened ally, which would 
depend on all NATO members agreeing to implement. This raises 
understandable concerns about whether NATO processes could 
inhibit reinforcement of a threatened ally. As the Polish Prime 
Minister said in August 2008, regarding reluctance in NATO to 
back Georgia against Russia: “Poland and the Poles do not want to 
be in alliances in which assistance comes at some point later – it is 
no good when assistance comes to dead people”27. At the same 
time, for many European allies, the problems of Ukraine – even 
the Baltics – are a distant worry. Italy, for example, was expected 
to gain 200,000 immigrants from North Africa and the Middle 
East in 2015. In April 2015, columnist Jim Hoagland spelled out 
the dilemma for NATO. He cited a long-time Italian NATO hand 
saying, a week after 900 North African refugees drowned trying to 
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get to Italy: “For us, the biggest threat comes from the South […] 
Our nightmares are not about Russian tanks invading from the 
east. They are about the terrorists a short boat ride away in Libya”. 
Hoagland also quotes a hawkish French member of parliament 
saying: “Nobody in France is debating about arming Ukraine […] 
We are debating how much national surveillance we need to spot 
terrorists returning from war zones in Syria and Iraq, and how to 
stop Africa from completely imploding”28. 
The Asia Pivot and European security 
The Ukraine crisis initially appeared to give weight to those who 
long opposed the Asia pivot, preferring instead that Europe remain 
an equal priority for the United States. Columnist Roger Cohen 
said: “Certainly, pivot to Asia does not look like such a great idea 
right now”29. It was crucial to stand up to Russia in eastern 
Ukraine, in part because if aggression was not challenged there, 
then China might believe that it could get away with similar 
actions in the Asia-Pacific. Still, in places like the Asia-Pacific, 
what matters is the actual balance of power, and availability of 
forces in the event of a conflict. In that sense, America being 
continually dragged into conflicts like eastern Ukraine was also 
likely to signal a vacuum or opening in Asia. Thus Poland’s 
Defense Minister hurt his own cause after meeting with U.S. 
Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, in April 2014. The U.S. 
would not, as Poland wanted, be permanently stationing troops in 
that country or the territory of the three Baltic countries. Instead, 
there would be very small, rotational exercises, numbering in the 
hundreds. The Polish official nevertheless criticized American 
strategic priorities and instead said that: “Events show that what is 
needed is a re-pivot, and that Europe was safe and secure because 
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America was in Europe”30. In reality, the U.S. is continuing with 
the Asia pivot, and the Ukraine crisis makes it all the more urgent 
that the European allies, via both NATO and the European Union, 
be able to stand on their own, without the United States if 
necessary. The New York Times reported in spring 2014 at the 
height of the crisis over Crimea that:  
[…] Mr. Obama next month will head back to Asia, and aides 
said he would again promote his policy of pivoting toward the 
region he believes represents the future for America’s strategic 
priorities. One goal then for Mr. Obama, aides said, is to 
challenge Europe to take more of a leadership role itself, a 
familiar theme from Washington but one infused with a new 
urgency by the Ukraine crisis
31
.  
The Asia pivot was long mischaracterized by its opponents as a 
retrenchment or abandonment of long-standing American allies. 
This was never the case. The core assumption – driven by 
overstretch abroad and economic crisis at home – is that to meet 
new challenges posed by the rise of China, the United States needs 
to hand over lead responsibility to capable allies for their 
immediate security while being supported by the United States. 
Europe was in a particularly good position to find ways to better 
pool resources. The Eurozone crisis remained (through 2015) the 
primary challenge affecting European stability, not eastern 
Ukraine. Combined with deep austerity, this meant that European 
nations had little incentive to increase defense spending. However, 
they are incentivized to better pool their capabilities and to 
coordinate effectively on major European diplomatic initiatives. 
There were several core elements of the allied response to Russia 
within this broader strategic context: signaling strong and united 
political isolation of  Russia for its illegal annexation over Crimea; 
gradually raising economic pain via sanctions which, combined 
with capital flight and dropping oil and gas prices, had a 
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significant impact on the Russian economy; symbolic but 
important reassurance of new NATO allies in a way that puts 
Europeans in the lead; and encouraging European-led diplomacy, 
in particular that pursued by German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, 
and French President, Francois Holland. 
Meanwhile, clear signals were sent to Russia that the West 
would work with it where it could. Just after terrorist attacks in 
France in January 2015, NATO Secretary General, Jens 
Stoltenberg, said: “That’s the reason why we still strive for a more 
cooperative and constructive relationship with Russia” – reflecting 
on the benefits of working with Russia on counter-terrorism
32
. The 
balance of power overwhelmingly favors the Western alliance and 
thus restraint and engagement was a strategic advantage relative to 
the complexity of the Ukraine crisis. The NATO allies collectively 
spend over $1 trillion a year on defense versus about $80 billion 
for Russia.  Russia made tactical gains in eastern Ukraine – but 
Moscow was, overall, playing a weak hand. NATO did not need to 
diminish the prospects for de-escalation of the crisis or discourage 
some kind of negotiated settlement about Ukraine’s future status33. 
In terms of military actions, the United States and the European 
allies focused mainly on how to provide low-level, but 
symbolically important, reassurance to new NATO members 
nearest to Russia. NATO sustained rotational deployments via 
exercises into allied countries concerned about Russia. This was 
done in ways that could be ratcheted up or down depending on 
Moscow’s behavior. NATO opted against permanent deployments 
so as not to give Vladimir Putin justification for even more 
aggression, i.e. via a claim that it was the allies who violated the 
NATO-Russia Founding Act. NATO’s approach to collective 
defense has, since it began enlargement in the mid-1990s, made its 
new members nervous because it is built upon reinforcing a 
member that is attacked, rather than on forward defense of 
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territory. That is not the automatic security guarantee countries 
like Poland hoped to get on joining NATO. In particular, it 
requires consensus among all NATO allies to implement any 
decision to reinforce one of its member states. The allies sought to 
address this in military terms at a summit meeting in Wales in 
September 2014. They created a new ‘spearhead’ force that can 
move rapidly to reinforce an ally in a crisis within forty-eight 
hours. The force-planning concept was relatively small – just up to 
5,000 in total – but, crucially, it was to be all-European in its 
makeup. 
The NATO spearhead force for rapid deployment in an Article 
V scenario is an important development as it does not require 
American ground forces to implement. There are, nonetheless, 
significant hurdles in terms of force structure, size, and costs. If 
one or two key contributing allies do not participate, the entire 
operational concept could unravel. This spearhead force, 
meanwhile, was not anticipated to even be deployable until 2016 – 
and, when available, it would only take one NATO ally to block 
consensus on its activation. Still, the model of building new force 
structures without the United States was important. Britain 
stepped forward early, offering 1,000 operational troops and an 
additional 3,500 for exercises and pre-deployment of equipment to 
facilitate its use. Prime Minister David Cameron said at the Wales 
summit: “No one will leave here with any doubt that our collective 
security is as strong as it has ever been. The Alliance is firmly 
committed to providing ongoing reassurance to our eastern 
Allies”34. Nonetheless, sustaining readiness for rapid deployment 
will be expensive even for such a small grouping. Who else would 
contribute and pay these costs was unclear when NATO planners 
met in November 2014 to review progress on the force structure. 
For example, would non-contributing allies offset the costs of the 
force? Consequently, an interim force was to be set up including 
                                                     
34 N. Morris, “Ukraine Crisis: NATO Agrees Major Troop Deployment to Guard 
Against Russian Aggression”, The Independent, 5 September 2014. 
108 Beyond Ukraine. EU and Russia in Search of a New Relation 
 
contributions from Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway
35
. 
Considerable work remains to fill the collective gaps so that the 
United States could facilitate European-only operations in the 
future. There was a new urgency to this rebalancing brought on by 
the Ukraine crisis because if the United States had to rush forces 
towards a much more strategically significant challenge in Asia, 
and Europe was unable to stand alone, a greater crisis might ensue. 
Conclusion. Towards a new transatlantic architecture 
Rather than force a rethink of major strategic priorities, like the 
Asia pivot, the United States has responded effectively to the 
Russia crisis by not playing into Moscow’s narrative and putting 
capable allies in the diplomatic, economic, and military lead. The 
United States has coordinated transatlantic consensus to apply 
painful political and economic costs on Russia without putting at 
risk cooperation on areas of mutual interest. It has creatively 
backed Germany and France as they took diplomatic leads in 
negotiating a significant cease-fire in Ukraine in early 2015. 
Working with its allies, it has developed within NATO an 
European-led spearhead response force, while also offering 
symbolic rotational exercises to demonstrate its commitment to 
reassure allies nearest to Russia. It has also worked to anchor the 
vital transatlantic relationship with Europe by investing in ongoing 
negotiations over a U.S.-EU trade deal. The United States has 
done this while sustaining its pivot towards Asia. Looking ahead, 
the United States and its allies will likely need to make a tough 
choice to revoke their promise of Ukrainian membership in NATO 
as there is not likely any solution to the crisis that includes that 
outcome. Additionally, the United States and its European allies 
must now make a direct and sustained commitment to work 
together to better consolidate and pool European capabilities. 
America’s European allies can provide the main tripwire forces for 
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collective defense operations and can have plans and capacity to 
project pooled military capabilities to conduct a Balkans or Libya-
style peace enforcement operation without (or supported by) the 
United States. If the transatlantic burdensharing relationship is 
successfully realigned, then the United States will be positioned to 
lead the transatlantic relationship into a durable and lasting 
architecture for the 21
st
 century. 
Conclusions. 
What Policy Actions for the EU? 
Aldo Ferrari 
After the Ukraine crisis, relations between the EU and Russia hit 
rock bottom, the lowest point from the end of the Cold War. To 
make things worse, today’s dispute is nothing but the latest 
chapter of an already long story of misunderstandings and 
conflicting strategies on the post-Soviet states of Eastern Europe 
and South Caucasus. The further deepening of this cleavage may 
inflict serious damage on all interested parties: the EU, Russia and 
several post-Soviet states. Therefore it is crucially important to 
overcome a scenario which may recreate the atmosphere of 
confrontation that marked the Cold War. It will not be an easy 
mission because of the very different aims of the involved actors. 
As Carmen Claudín and Nicolás de Pedro put it in chapter 1, “the 
centrality of the Ukrainian question for Russia lies in the fact that 
it is not simply a foreign affairs issue – like Iran or China is. 
Ukraine is at the heart of Russia’s national interests and 
essentialist narrative. On the contrary, for the EU, Ukraine was an 
issue of mere foreign policy – with no perspective at all of an 
institutional integration - but now it has become a matter of self-
assertion and inner coherence of its own values”. 
Although the Russian proposal of the idea of a ‘Greater 
Europe’ – from Lisbon to Vladivostok (see Timofeev’s chapter 5) 
– appears scarcely feasible in the present day scenario, the gravity 
of the Ukraine crisis imposes a profound rethinking of the 
relationship between the EU and Russia. The competition for post-
Soviet space represents the most serious threat to the partnership 
between Brussels and Moscow. Indeed, relations with Russia are 
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essential for the EU – and the whole West – to deal with many 
pressing issues, including the conflicts in Syria, Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the increasing terrorist threat, and eventually with a 
rise of the political and military prowess of China. Russia and the 
European Union have various and good reasons to enhance their 
cooperation, starting from Ukraine. Besides, establishing effective 
Euro-Russian cooperation on Ukraine may let the United States 
focus on the issues more relevant to its own security and economic 
interests. 
Against this background, some policy recommendations may 
be conveyed to the EU. Indeed, most of them may equally apply to 
Moscow too despite its deeply different political stance. 
The time is ripe to reset Eastern Partnership 
In order to build a new and more solid relationship with Moscow, 
the European Union should adopt a consistent and largely 
innovative policy matching its own interests with Russia’s security 
interests, while upholding the independence of Ukraine and other 
former Soviet republics. No matter how well-founded the Russian 
argument is, the EU cannot help but acknowledge that Moscow 
perceives the EaP as an antagonistic partnership. This preliminary 
acknowledgement is key because, from the Russian viewpoint, the 
eastwards expansion of the EU is nothing but a Trojan Horse for 
NATO enlargement. This holds true also when it comes to other 
Western countries. As Sean Key puts it in chapter 6 “looking 
ahead, the United States and its allies will likely need to make a 
tough choice to revoke their promise of Ukrainian membership in 
NATO as there is not likely any solution to the crisis that includes 
that outcome”.  
The first necessary step to reset the relationship between 
Brussels and Moscow is – as much as possible – a search for all 
possible links between the EU’s project of political integration of 
post-Soviet countries with Russia’s. Unfortunately, there has been 
no serious and systemic dialogue between the two sides for almost 
twenty-five years. The establishment of a frank discussion on this 
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issue would help rebuild at least some level of trust. In a nutshell, 
as Luca Ratti maintains in chapter 3 “… there will certainly not be 
a secure continent without a comprehensive reconciliation with 
Russia”.   
Such a comprehensive reconciliation must inevitably take into 
account the historical sensitivity of Eastern European countries 
towards Russia – with special attention to Poland’s, as highlighted 
by Stepan Bielanski in chapter 4 – but without jeopardizing the 
necessary strategic cooperation with Moscow. In the last two 
years, indeed, a kind of unofficial coalition including not only 
Poland and the Baltic States, but also Russoskeptics in Britain, 
Sweden, and other countries has influenced the EU’s attitude 
toward Russia. However Germany too, and consequently other 
states of “Old Europe”, have taken a tougher stance vis à vis 
Moscow. A more balanced approach is probably needed to support 
the EU’s economic and strategic interests.  
On the other hand, despite the strategic importance of acquiring 
the Crimea and great domestic support for it, Putin too should feel 
strongly motivated to get out of today’s trap of political isolation 
and the progressive economic decline of his country. One should 
note that this economic decline does not primarily stem from the 
Western sanctions or the recent fall of oil prices. Russia’s 
economy is overly dependent on exports of raw materials and still 
awaits deep structural reform. It is vital for Moscow to restart and 
invest in the partnership with Europe and the West, also with the 
view to modernizing its economy.  
Clearly, the current crisis between Russia and the West has 
wide-ranging geopolitical implications. Faced with political and 
economic pressures from the US and the EU, Russia is 
increasingly tilting towards China. However, as the balance of 
power between China and Russia continues to shift in favor of the 
former, Moscow risks becoming a junior partner of Beijing.  
A deep and long-term alienation from Russia may turn out to 
be dangerous for both the US and the EU. Indeed, Sino-Russian 
economic integration and political alignment may force the EU to 
114 Beyond Ukraine. EU and Russia in Search of a New Relation 
 
face a rival economic space stretching from St. Petersburg to 
Shanghai.  
European interests come first 
The establishment of renewed cooperation between the EU and 
Russia should be primarily based on European interests, which do 
not completely coincide with those of the US. It would suffice to 
note that bilateral trade between Russia and the EU amounted to 
$401 billion in 2013, while Russia-US total trade amounted for 
just $22 billion. Furthermore, the bulk of the EU-Russia trade is 
made of strategically important goods: energy product. To this 
aim, one should recall that even today almost 40 per cent of the 
EU gas imports come from Russia. Such percentage reaches a full 
100 per cent for some Eastern European countries, starting from 
the Baltic republics. The Russia-EU relationship is therefore 
basically different than the one between Russia and the US, not 
only because of geographic proximity.  
From both an economic and strategic point of view the Ukraine 
crisis and the reshaping of the relationship with Moscow are 
substantially European problems. Therefore the EU should 
definitively assume the leading role on those issues. 
Moving Ukraine from a battlefield to a cooperation field 
Ukraine and other former Soviet countries should no longer be 
considered a battlefield between European – or Western – interests 
and Russian ones, but as a space of necessary and feasible 
cooperation between them. Once more, this objective will not be 
easy to achieve, but it is the only possible path towards the 
stabilization of Ukraine and the normalization of the relationship 
between the EU and Russia.  
The EU should encourage Russia to definitively recognize the 
independence of post-Soviet states in a context of partnership, not 
of exclusion. To accomplish this a mechanism of regular bilateral 
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consultations is needed not only to manage the Ukraine crisis but 
also to prevent the emergence of new ones in the post-Soviet 
space. The issue of the Treaty on European Security, as well as 
reform of the OSCE should be put back on the agenda. At the 
same time the work of the NATO-Russia Council should be 
resumed as a discussion forum to address common threats and 
challenges, not only on the European continent. The Ukrainian 
membership in NATO should be excluded or, at least, postponed. 
The use of force to resolve Ukraine’s internal conflicts should 
be completely excluded as well as the supply of heavy weapons to 
the Ukrainian government and all measures that might encourage 
military escalation. Such efforts in the security and military field 
should go hand in hand with a joint EU-Russia initiative aimed at 
providing economic support to Ukraine. By the same token, it is 
crucial to promote rounds of negotiations with a view to removing 
the incompatibility between the European Free Trade Agreements 
and the Eurasian Customs Union. In addition, the EU should try 
hard to support Ukraine by laying the groundwork for functional 
and sustainable rule of law. 
Last but not least, the stabilization of a historically and 
culturally heterogeneous country like Ukraine might also require a 
process of federalization. Crimea could be included in such a 
process, too. 
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